

Chaillot Papers

- 19 -
June 1995

THE BALTIC STATES:
SECURITY AND DEFENCE
AFTER INDEPENDENCE

*Eitvydas Bajarūnas, Mare Haab
and Ilmars Viksne
Edited by Peter van Ham*

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WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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ISSN 1017-7566

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INTRODUCTION

Peter van Ham⁽¹⁾

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the three Baltic states -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia -- have made significant strides in consolidating their independence, putting themselves not only on the geographical map of Europe, but also on the mental map of Western policy-makers. In retrospect, the period in which the Baltic states recaptured their sovereignty from Moscow was astonishingly brief: in barely two years, and without widespread conflict or great loss of life, these states shed the status of Soviet Republic and accomplished full independence.

Although the Baltic states have made much progress in reorienting their economies towards the West and developing a comprehensive foreign and security policy, they still face the reality that, for geographical and historical reasons, their role and place in Europe is uncertain. In this *Chaillot Paper*, scholars from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania examine in detail the problems their countries face in forming their security and defence policies. The authors analyse the main security challenges facing the Baltic republics, as well as the ways in which they have organized their defence forces. Inevitably, much attention is paid to relations with the West and Western institutions, as well as the residual threat which Russia still poses and the possibilities offered by cooperation among the Baltic and Nordic states in addressing regional security challenges.

This introductory chapter summarises the main points brought out in these case studies, and makes an analysis of the Baltic states' future in Europe's security structure.

Baltic independence and the road to Europe

The Baltic republics played a pivotal role in dismantling the Soviet Union's 'external empire'. Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*, introduced in 1986, allowed critical debate to spread beyond dissident groups. This gave rise to the formation of opposition groups in all three Baltic states (the Latvian Popular Front; Sajudis in Lithuania; and the Popular Front of Estonia), which became focal points for popular movements calling for national independence. Inadvertently, *glasnost* let the genie out of the bottle, opening the way for Baltic activists to question the circumstances of the Soviet annexation of their states in 1940, and by doing so also questioning the legitimacy of Soviet rule over their countries. Discontent with Soviet rule was expressed at many so-called 'calendar demonstrations', in which large gatherings of people commemorated the key events in their national history (such as the declaration of their independence after World War I and the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which resulted in the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR). Probably, the 'Baltic Way' demonstration of 23 August 1989 -- exactly fifty years after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact -- at which almost 2 million people formed a human chain stretching from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius, has become the best known of these in the West.

The Baltic states declared their sovereignty and independence in economic matters as early as 1989, and official referendums (in February-March 1991) clearly indicated that the majority of the population favoured separation from the Soviet Union: in Lithuania 90% voted in favour of independence, 73 % in Latvia and 77% in Estonia. In the case of Lithuania, Moscow imposed an economic embargo and put significant pressure on all the Baltic states to remain in the Soviet Union's fold. Moscow used only limited military force to quell Baltic independence, but many in Europe will still remember the days in January 1991 when Soviet interior ministry troops (OMON) fired on civilians gathered around strategic buildings in Riga and Vilnius, killing 15 people and injuring hundreds. Following the abortive *coup d'état* by hard-line Communist forces in Moscow in August 1991, all three of the Baltic states declared their full independence and asserted their authority over former Soviet institutions. Following the official recognition of the independence of all three Baltic states by many Western countries, Moscow decided to acknowledge their sovereignty on 4 September 1991. Only three months later the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

The tumultuous history of the Baltic states testifies that this region of north-east Europe has traditionally been an area where both Russia and the West have tried to exert their influence in strategic and ideological competition. Over a period stretching back to the thirteenth century, the Baltic states have been occupied (some more than once) by Germany, Poland, Sweden and Russia. Despite, or perhaps because of their historical experience, the Baltic states have developed and maintained a strong national identity and have cherished their own language and culture. They also clearly feel that they have both their historical roots and their future in Europe; they do not feel that they are part of the Slavic world. This is combined with a general feeling that their independence is well earned, since whereas most Soviet successor states had independence thrust upon them in 1991, the Baltic states broke away before the dissolution of the USSR, and by doing so contributed to the breakdown of the Soviet structure.

After World War I, the Western powers had originally tried to turn the Baltic region into a buffer zone between themselves and Soviet Russia, but it is clear that today the Baltic states refuse to function as a modern-day cordon sanitaire, wishing to keep their current period of purgatory as brief as possible by joining Western security structures. From the beginning, the Baltic states made it clear that they wanted to cut the umbilical cord which linked them with the other former Soviet republics, and with Moscow in particular. The Baltic states have refused to see themselves as Soviet successor states, and they have remained outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the loose structure which succeeded the USSR in December 1991. Baltic politicians have also refused to be included in what Russians call the 'near abroad', to indicate that Russia's sphere of influence definitely excludes the Baltic region.

Baltic independence has been supported by the West, especially by Germany, Poland and the Scandinavian countries. All three Baltic states have been directly admitted to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE -- now OSCE). Lithuania and Estonia joined the Council of Europe in May 1993; Latvia joined in February 1995 after having fulfilled the requirements on minority rights. The European Union (EU) has identified the Baltic republics as potential future member states. It has already signed free trade agreements with all three countries, as well as Europe Agreements, on 12 June 1995, which will form another stepping stone

towards joining the EU. In June 1993 the EU clearly stated that those countries which had Europe Agreements had a realistic prospect of joining the Union in the years ahead.

The Baltic states have also, be it somewhat reluctantly, cooperated in the negotiation of a European Stability Pact. This process, initiated by the EU, consisted of a so-called 'Baltic Regional Table' which has addressed the minority and border questions of these countries (and has also involved Russia). The Stability Pact has aimed at defusing tensions in this region and preparing the Baltic states for membership of the EU.

The Western European Union (WEU) granted the Central European countries -- *including* the Baltic states -- the status of Associate Partner in June 1994. The criterion used by WEU was that only countries with Europe Agreements (with the EU) and those which were due to sign such agreements in the near future, would be offered this status. Although associate partnership does not give these countries any security guarantee, it is an important step towards integrating Central Europe in the European security debate and its institutions. By putting the Baltic states in the same category as countries like the Czech Republic and Poland, WEU has made it clear that it attaches special attention to the security of the Baltic states and considers them to be potential candidates for membership. This step has been highly appreciated by the Baltic governments and has been seen as a major step towards their eventual integration in Europe's security structure.

The Baltic states have already expressed their wish to join NATO as soon as possible, and were among the first countries to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), early in 1994. Lithuania has been an especially enthusiastic participant in the PfP programme and has been involved in both ground and naval NATO exercises; it has also sent troops to Croatia attached to the Danish peacekeepers. The Baltic states clearly consider active participation in the PfP as a preparation and a prerequisite for their entry into NATO. It has also become clear that NATO is not at all keen to accept as new member states countries which have not made a serious effort to establish and develop their own national defence structure. The Partnership for Peace initiative, as well as the many bilateral and regional cooperative schemes initiated in the last few years, offers the Baltic states the opportunity to bring their defence capabilities up to Western (i.e. NATO) standards.

As Russia considered them part of the USSR, Moscow is reluctant to accept the idea that the Baltic states may become members of the EU and WEU, and has in particular raised strong objections against their joining NATO. Russian nationalists and ex-Communists argue that this adds insult to injury, since it brings NATO not only closer to, but even encroaches on the area of the former Soviet Union (FSU). However, the road towards the Baltic states' full membership of these Western organizations still remains quite long, and it seems unlikely that these countries will be in the first wave of countries becoming full members of the EU, WEU and/or NATO.

The Baltic states have therefore, apart from integration into the West, adopted two other basic foreign policy objectives: to strengthen regional cooperation (i.e. among the Baltic states and with other Nordic countries), and to develop good, stable

relations with Russia and other CIS states. These objectives have also been reflected in the way the Baltic countries have developed their security and defence policies.

The Baltic states' security and defence policies

Like other countries, the Baltic states have to acknowledge that 'security' is a multi-dimensional concept which has a wide variety of aspects and includes not only political and military facets, but also has economic, environmental and even demographic aspects. In consolidating their newly established independence, the Baltic states have come to learn that sovereignty and state-building mean far more than simply acquiring the paraphernalia of nationhood. As former Soviet republics, the Baltic states have encountered a number of unique problems. The urgent need to redirect their economies -- which were fully integrated in the Soviet structure -- has been given a high priority, as has the sensitive question of what to do about the large Russian minorities which found themselves living in 'foreign' countries after Moscow accepted Baltic independence in 1991.

Although the Baltic states have clearly acknowledged that their countries would be militarily difficult to defend due to the lack of strategic depth, their open borders and their proximity to Russia, they have nevertheless emphasized the need to establish a strong defensive posture. However, they have very limited economic resources to devote to developing viable military forces, especially since they have inherited little from the Soviet Army and were subject to a Western arms embargo until 1993.

As small states in a volatile area, the Baltic countries have therefore realized that their security could clearly not be guaranteed without outside help. Unlike unsuccessful attempts to develop effective cooperation among the three Baltic republics (for instance, after World War I Estonia and Latvia did not want to be drawn into Lithuania's quarrels with Poland and Germany over Wilno -- now Vilnius), Baltic cooperation has now met with some success. The Baltic states' current security and defence policies reflect the need for international and regional cooperation, not only through the establishment of practical links among the three Baltic republics themselves, but also with the Scandinavian countries. The initiative to set up a Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT), with the cooperation of the countries of the Baltic Sea Council and the United Kingdom, is the most notable example of this trend towards cooperation in the field of security and defence. In March 1995, the Baltic states also agreed to coordinate their approaches and policies concerning their relations with the EU, WEU and NATO.

This does not mean that the Baltic states have identical security concerns and policies. For example, although all Russian troops have now been withdrawn from the Baltics, there is still a small Russian military presence at the early-warning radar station at Skrunda in Latvia. Lithuania faces the continuing problem of the transit of Russian troops and military equipment through its territory to the Kaliningrad enclave, despite the agreements which have been reached. This area of former East Prussia was incorporated in the USSR at the insistence of Stalin, who turned it into a key military bastion. Kaliningrad is now a strategic military outpost for Moscow but President Yeltsin has also granted it special economic status, giving it more freedom to establish independent international contacts. The Russian troops withdrawn from the Baltic have mainly been stationed there, which has resulted in the accumulation of an

estimated 100,000 troops in Kaliningrad. Partly for this reason, Poland and Lithuania perceive Kaliningrad as a potential threat to their security and have asked for the complete demilitarization of the region.

The Baltic states also have different demographic configurations. Only Lithuania has a largely homogeneous population and hence has few problems with the Russian minority, since in 1992 they formed 'only' 9 per cent of the population, whereas the Russian minority formed 29 per cent of the population of Estonia and 33 per cent of the population of Latvia. Given that Moscow emphasizes time and again that it considers it essential to defend the rights and interests of Russians (and Russophones) in the FSU, the large number of Russians on their territory is considered a potential threat by the Baltic governments -- by Latvia and Estonia in particular. The inclusion of all three Baltic states in the Council of Europe, the negotiations in the context of the European Stability Pact and the close involvement of the OSCE in the drafting of laws on citizenship, has, however, done much to prevent a potential Baltic-Russian conflict.

The Baltic states and Europe

There is little doubt that the Baltic states belong to 'Europe', but this says very little about their prospect of joining those organizations which exemplify the European idea and identity: the EU and WEU. What the Baltic states fear most is that they will be excluded when the EU/WEU expands into Central Europe. Such selective enlargement will inevitably draw a line in Europe (even if it is only a dotted one), which could give the false impression that the Baltic states again fall within Russia's exclusive sphere of influence. Given the Baltic states' recent history, their concern that Russia will again return to its imperialist past is understandable. The statement by Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on 18 April 1995 that 'there may be cases when the use of direct military force will be needed to defend our compatriots abroad,'⁽²⁾ has done little to reassure the Baltic countries that Russia has broken with its expansionist tradition. Paradoxically, their urgent need to fill the Baltic security vacuum is probably precisely what makes their membership of Western security organizations unlikely in the near future.

There is little doubt that the three Baltic states will successfully change their societal system and establish a modern market economy. Estonia in particular has introduced effective economic reforms and has succeeded in achieving impressive macro-economic stability and a stable currency. All three Baltic republics have attracted significant foreign investment and have already shifted their trade relations from the traditional Soviet market to the rest of Europe and beyond. The signing of Europe Agreements with the Baltic states will facilitate their systemic transformation, stabilize their political systems and deepen economic interdependence with Western and Central Europe. Their geographic proximity to Scandinavia is bound to help in this process.

For obvious economic reasons the successful transformation of the Baltic states is in the West's interest. The Baltic states already function as a gateway to Russia and other CIS countries, and Russian companies often use the many Baltic ports as their 'window on Europe.' But the consolidation of Baltic independence is also in the West's political and strategic interest. Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt has

correctly argued that 'Russia's policies toward the Baltic countries will be the litmus test of its new direction', and that 'Russia's conduct towards these states will show the true nature of Russia's commitment to international norms and principles.'⁽³⁾ The West has limited influence over Russia's policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, but the ability of Western policy to affect developments in the Baltic region is considerable. It should be made clear that despite Russia's understandable security concerns in the Baltic region, Moscow should realize that what it calls its 'near abroad' is also the 'near abroad' of the West. Moreover, with the enlargement of the EU to include Finland and Sweden, the Baltic states have two additional powerful voices to support their sovereignty and their freedom to strengthen their ties with the Western security framework.

LITHUANIA'S SECURITY DILEMMA

Eitvydas Bajarnas⁽⁴⁾

There are now some first signs that European security is moving from a post-Cold War situation to what might be called a 'post-post-Cold War' system. The post-Cold War condition in Europe was characterized by increasing West European integration, with a parallel process of *disintegration* in Eastern Europe. Today the situation is different: all Central European countries have now very clearly expressed their wish to join the European integration process, whereas the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have embarked on an integration process of their own. A new trend in European security can therefore be perceived, namely the 'division' of the continent into two separate 'integrating areas': the European Union (EU) and the CIS. Although this new situation may bear certain similarities with the Cold War, there is at the same time a significant difference, namely that both areas do not necessarily have to confront each other, but may cooperate within the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) or, in future, in a NATO-Russia/CIS consultative council.

In the next decade, relations between the EU and NATO (which may be enlarged to include certain countries of Central Europe) on the one hand, and Russia and the CIS on the other, will be the most important factor in European security. To a large extent, the security of the Baltic states will be dependent upon how this new post-post-Cold War East-West relationship develops.

New security challenges for the Baltic states

Located in the geographical centre of Europe, all three Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - were for centuries an arena of confrontation between East and West, as well as between North and East. But, at the same time, each Baltic state has remained an integral part of Europe's cultural, spiritual and economic development, and as a result has cultivated traditions that are different from those of their Slav neighbours to the east. From the end of the 18th century, when they were incorporated in the Russian empire, the Baltic states were subjected to political and, especially, cultural oppression combined with substantial Russification. All three Baltic nations regained independence in the aftermath of World War I. Their independence was again lost as a result of the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 and from then onwards the Baltic states found themselves in the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union forced the Baltic states to sign military agreements in 1939, and occupied them in 1940. After imposed elections, the new Baltic parliaments requested inclusion of their states into the Soviet Union. Independence came to an end and Sovietisation began immediately: industries were nationalised and the collectivization of agriculture began. Worst of all, the Soviet authorities deported tens of thousands of citizens (mostly the intelligentsia) from the Baltics to Siberia and elsewhere. Between 1940 and 1953, the Baltic states lost about one third of their population in this way. In 1944, the Soviet army re-occupied the Baltic states -- where some parts of the population had sided with the Germans at the very beginning of the Nazi occupation in the hope of regaining independence and shaking off Soviet

domination -- and an intensive guerrilla war started against the Soviet occupying authorities which, in some places, went on until 1953 and which lasted the longest in Lithuania. Despite successive waves of Russian immigration, engineered by the central authorities in an attempt to Russify them, the Baltic states maintained their sense of national identity and separateness, finally re-establishing their independence and regaining international recognition in 1991, following the failed August coup in Moscow.

History has shown that the Baltic states lack the essentials independently to safeguard their national security and sovereignty. They would certainly be overrun in the event of a military invasion, and their security must therefore be seen in terms of social and economic coherence, and must rest on something other than straightforward military defence.⁽⁵⁾ This fact also implies that the foreign and security policies of these states should go beyond setting up national armies.

Several ideas for Lithuania's foreign and security policies were expressed during the first years of its independence. One of the first ideas was to develop close and institutionalized cooperation among the Baltic states themselves. This has, among other things, resulted in the establishment of a special Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) and the Baltic Council (see below). Primarily for reasons of geography, as well as culture and history, the idea of close relations with the Nordic countries has also been promoted. Moreover, ideas of establishing a 'NATO-bis' (i.e. a collective defence organization of Central European countries, including the Baltic states and perhaps even Ukraine), or even obtaining security guarantees from both Russia and the West, have been put forward. Finally, the idea of a Baltic-to-Black-Sea framework for cooperation has been launched, promoted mainly by Ukraine. All options for guaranteeing Lithuania's security -- from maintaining the policy of neutrality to dependence on international organizations or security guarantees provided by certain countries -- have proven unrealistic. This is why Lithuania has made a clear choice: to seek membership of NATO, the EU and WEU.

During their very first years of independence the Baltic states tried to determine what their place would be in the 'new' Europe. Although the Baltic states were obviously part and parcel of the former Soviet Union, most Baltic politicians now emphasize that they belong henceforth to Central Europe. While this is certainly the case, the Baltic states nevertheless share a number of characteristics which set them apart from other Central European states. First of all, there are the problems they face due to their large Russian minorities, especially those in Estonia and Latvia (it should be stressed that the Baltic states vary in their ethnic composition: whereas 34% of the population in Latvia and 30% in Estonia are Russians, in Lithuania the figure is only 9% according to the latest statistics). Moreover, a continuing degree of economic dependence means that the Baltic states cannot escape the Russian embrace as easily as the other former communist countries. Of course, the tradition of statehood makes them different from the rest of the republics of the former Soviet Union. This is acknowledged by most Russians, who will agree that the Baltic states are indeed 'different' and more 'European' than the other states of the former Soviet Union.

So, while developing its ties with European institutions, Lithuania, like the other Baltic states, is seeking to avoid isolation from the other Central European countries, especially the Visegrad group. Both the Baltic states and the Visegrad countries are

making efforts to integrate into European political, economic and security structures. Indeed, in 1994 Lithuania obtained WEU Associate Partner status, making it in this respect equal to the other Central European states. Moreover, all three Baltic states signed Europe Agreements with the EU on 12 June 1995 and therefore now enjoy the same status in the EU as the other six Central European states. This has created a good precedent for the equal treatment of *all* the Central European countries in their relations with European bodies.

In their search for a new identity, the Baltic states have discovered that, despite many shared problems and concerns, they are all very different. The Estonians, who live in the north bordering on Russia's Leningrad oblast, are a Finno-Ugric nation closely related to the neighbouring Finns. The Latvians and Lithuanians are ethnic Baltic nations whose languages, although different, both belong to the Indo-European group of languages. Latvians, like Estonians, are predominantly Lutheran, and share traditional close ties with Scandinavian culture. Lithuania is almost exclusively Roman Catholic, and has close religious, cultural and historic links with Poland. Lithuania was a big and powerful state during the Middle Ages, while Estonia and Latvia first achieved statehood in the aftermath of World War I. It is, however, clear that it is the geopolitical position of the Baltic states that has in large part determined their common fate in the modern era. The region's favourable geographical location, bordering the Baltic Sea, has brought great prosperity, but its situation as a 'bridge' between Russia and the West has brought many disadvantages and dangers as well. The main drawback is of course that this territory has been the object of competition between powerful states in the West (mostly Germany) and the East (mostly Russia).

Despite the precarious geopolitical location of the Baltic states, it must be recognised that their most serious security problems are consequences of the economic and political transition in these countries (inflation and the fall in industrial production), as well as corruption in the state apparatus and various institutions, and a lack of political maturity that could lead to governments becoming increasingly fragile. It could therefore be argued that the vital security issues facing Central European states -- including the Baltic states -- lie 'neither in formal defence guarantees nor in widening the old security structure, but mainly in an economic, political, ethnic sphere.'⁽⁶⁾ Indeed, while Central European states have adopted new constitutions and held free elections, the day-to-day practice of democracy is still not up to Western standards. Political parties are weak since, after years of one-party rule, most people distrust the very idea of party membership. Society and the political system are under harsh economic pressure. Decisions needed to implement reform are very painful and political leaders are hesitant to take them. Corruption -- petty and major -- distorts the political process and erodes public faith in the power of democratic political decisions. Governments have demonstrated the ability to deal with many of these problems, but their ability to do so may depend to a large extent on factors outside their control. Organized crime is among the most serious security threats the Baltic states face today. The continued inability of governments to solve basic economic problems, coupled with an increase in organized and violent crime, may lead ordinary citizens to give up their faith in democracy and the market economy, especially if there is also a rather cautious attitude among major West European countries and institutions towards the aspiration of the Baltic states to 'join Europe'.

The major *external* risks for Lithuania's security today are connected with instability on the territory of Russia and the CIS, which is characterized by inter-regional, ethnic-religious, territorial and/or social conflicts into which Lithuania could also be drawn. Vilnius also faces the risk of renewed Russian expansionism and Moscow's meddling in Lithuania's internal affairs. As was shown by a public opinion survey conducted by *Baltic Surveys* in September 1994, Lithuanians are currently less concerned than they were in 1992 (prior to the withdrawal of Russian troops) of an external threat to their country; a majority (54% compared with 46% in 1992) is not at all concerned at the prospect of such an attack. The Baltic states do not seriously run the risk of a direct Russian threat to their territorial integrity (even if, when in the above-mentioned survey, about specific potential threats, Lithuania's population was divided over whether Russia posed a threat to their country, 46% said yes and 43% no). However, Russia might very well attempt to use economic blackmail and pressure. Lithuania's economic dependence on Russia (especially on energy and raw materials) is a significant factor in this respect.⁽⁷⁾ Lithuania must also face the threat of nuclear accidents, terrorist activities, and uncontrolled refugee traffic or illegal immigration. This is often accompanied by the smuggling of drugs, guns, radioactive material and the illegal transportation of other goods. Lithuania's borders are relatively open and unprotected, and the increasing flow of goods from Russia and other CIS countries is in danger of overwhelming border controls.

How to handle the problem of Russia

The most acute foreign and security policy challenge facing all three Baltic states is the management of their relations with Russia. It is clear that Baltic security will always be in jeopardy as long as Russia is hostile and authoritarian. The most serious problem which the Baltic states face is Russia's reluctance to accept Baltic independence. Many Russians, both among the policy-making élite and the Russian populace, have been unable to come to terms with Baltic independence. This was again clearly indicated by a poll of 615 officers of the Russian military forces conducted in August 1994 by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. In the list of Russia's enemies, these military officers put (in order) Latvia, Afghanistan, Lithuania, Estonia and the United States.⁽⁸⁾ This attitude towards the Baltic states is, of course, no recent phenomenon. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russians have believed that their natural western borders are on the Baltic sea, providing Russia with ice-free ports, a strategic position for the defence of northern Russia and a 'window on Europe'. Baltic leaders are therefore convinced that Moscow is desperately trying to keep their countries firmly in its sphere of interest. It is equally firmly believed that if the West does not respond to Russian pressure on the Baltic states, or only responds ambiguously, Moscow will be emboldened and will increase its efforts.

As Sweden's former Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, formulated it: 'Russia's policies toward the Baltic countries will be the litmus test of its new direction . . . Russia's conduct toward these states will show the true nature of Russia's commitment to international norms and principles.'⁽⁹⁾ Russia's behaviour towards the Baltic states is typified by its attempts to discredit the Baltic states (especially Estonia and Latvia) by claiming that the 'human rights' of ethnic Russians have been grossly violated there. But investigations by the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities have shown that there has been no gross violation of human rights in the Baltic states which, unlike Russia, have been granted membership of the Council of Europe. At the

same time, it is widely understood that Russia is one of the key actors in the Baltic region -- and it is a considerable achievement on the part of both Russia and Lithuania that there are no problems between the two countries concerning ethnic minorities, borders or other complicated issues. There are no insurmountable problems -- that is the point of departure for constructing sound relations between Russia and Lithuania.

However, the transit of Russian troops based in Kaliningrad through Lithuania continues to give rise to worries and suspicions in Lithuania. This is a relatively 'new' issue since Lithuania, until 1993, played down the military transit question, giving priority to the quick withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory (which was completed one year before Russian troops had been withdrawn from Estonia, Latvia and the eastern part of Germany). But, with the Russian troops gone, Vilnius is now working hard to restrict the quantity and types of Russian cargo and personnel that will be allowed to be transported through Lithuania, or at least prepare strict rules which will manage transit in a 'more orderly' fashion. During 1993-94, military transit through the territory of Lithuania was regulated by the provisions of the Lithuanian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany, which expired in December 1994. During these two years, a number of violations and irregularities occurred and Russia at times also used Lithuanian airspace without permission.

This has made a new legal basis for military transit through Lithuania essential. Previously it was decided that transit after 1 January 1995 would be subject to the Lithuanian national regulations on the carrying of military and dangerous cargo that had been approved by the Lithuanian Government on 3 October 1994. On 18 January 1995, however, Vilnius sent a note informing Russia that the regulation established by the Lithuanian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Germany would remain in force until 31 December 1995, with a possible prolongation for subsequent one-year periods. Russia has now accepted this Lithuanian proposal, and all agreements between both governments on economic and trade relations (which include most favoured nation status) will come into force in the near future. Despite criticism from opposition parties, the settlement of the transit issue should be regarded as a relative success for the Lithuanian authorities. Firstly, by solving the delicate problem of transit, Lithuania once again demonstrated its willingness to contribute to European security and stability; the *non-provocative* way of resolving this very sensitive security problem was considered the only possible way of conducting Lithuania's relations with Russia. Secondly, by solving the transit problem without signing a *formal* agreement (it is important to note that only the *regulation* governing military transit, provided by the above-mentioned treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany, continues to be valid), it proved possible to protect Lithuania's national interest without losing face and its diplomatic leverage *vis-à-vis* Russia.

Uncertainties over the future of the Kaliningrad region remain closely related to the ambiguity of Russia's future. In the meantime, the extremely large number of temporarily stored military hardware and personnel stationed in Kaliningrad have a serious destabilizing effect on the military balance in the Baltic region.

It should be stressed that the development and future of the Kaliningrad enclave, like the question of transit through Lithuanian territory,⁽¹⁰⁾ is a matter of great importance to the overall security and stability of the Baltic region. It might perhaps be thought that Lithuania has an obligation towards Russia to allow military transit, and that the

Russian Federation possesses an unquestionable right to transit through Lithuanian territory. This is not the case. On the contrary, Lithuania has neither given, nor will ever allow, any predetermined transit rights of any kind.⁽¹¹⁾ It should be understood that Lithuania permits transit only on the basis of mutual understanding and goodwill among friendly states, but at the same time Lithuania has no intention of isolating the Kaliningrad region. It is Lithuania's intention to encourage Kaliningrad to become more open and ready to cooperate with neighbouring states, progressively turning the enclave, economically and politically, into an integral part of the Baltic region. Transit through Lithuanian territory should thus be seen as Vilnius's contribution to the security and stability of the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. Lithuania has therefore called upon the appropriate European organizations to become involved in the Kaliningrad question, and the EU and the OSCE have expressed their concern over this issue.

Obviously, the Kaliningrad question is only one of the problematic issues in Lithuanian-Russian relations, but it illustrates how the future course of Russia (and the other CIS countries) will determine the nature of European security -- Central European security in particular. It is certainly true that `though the debate is dominated by gloom and doom, one has to acknowledge that from many points of view the Russian position in the world is in many ways more favourable than that of the USSR, at least as it stood prior to 1985.⁽¹²⁾ In the past, the former Soviet Union tried to build its security by establishing and maintaining a considerable buffer zone in Central Europe. Even though it does not seem that Russia is trying to re-establish a similar security zone, Moscow's attempts to dominate its so-called `near abroad' are well known. Apart from possible Russian tendencies towards expansionism, Lithuania must also reckon with the scenario of a disintegration of Russian central power, which could take the form of either a peaceful dissolution or a violent war. Recent examples of tragic events in Chechnya pose a serious threat not only to the security of the Russian Federation, but to the whole region and the continent as well. It is clear that Russia's behaviour towards Chechnya `may threaten democracy in Russia, and even herald a new era of mutual suspicion in East-West relations.⁽¹³⁾ Yet even if Russia holds together, a number of problems could spread beyond its borders. That is why, even in the most optimistic scenarios of Russia's development, its influence on events in Europe -- Central Europe in particular -- will remain significant.

It seems that after a very constructive attitude during the first five post-Cold War years, exemplified by Soviet military withdrawal from Central Europe, Russia has now entered a period of rethinking its foreign policy. Now that the post-Cold War honeymoon has drawn to an end, Russia has made it more than clear that the projection of Western influence eastward is unacceptable to Moscow. It is beyond doubt that NATO's eastern enlargement will weaken Russia's political influence on the further development of European security, especially in Central Europe. But it is not only Russia's *military* security which is at stake. As one major Russian commentator has formulated it: `we [Russians] need this influence not in order to impose our will on East European countries, but to secure more advantageous conditions for ourselves on the market and make sure that Russia should be reckoned with in Europe and in the rest of the world.⁽¹⁴⁾

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russian leaders `appear to have believed that the former Soviet republics would be forced to remain in a close

alliance with Russia and would quickly abandon their headlong rush to go it alone.⁽¹⁵⁾ This Russian 'optimism' has now given way to a more assertive Russian policy towards the 'near abroad'. Despite the obvious weakness of the CIS structure, it seems that Russia is now determined to 'redouble its efforts to build a workable mechanism that would be capable of regulating the space of the former USSR.'⁽¹⁶⁾ This strategy has already been quite successful: Georgia and Azerbaijan have, after initial reluctance and strong Russian pressure, decided to join the CIS, and Moldova has strengthened its commitment to the CIS by shifting from partial to full membership. It is evident that Russia, 'which has not yet found its new role in world politics, views the CIS as the main field for affirming its independent role in world affairs.'⁽¹⁷⁾ Around five hundred agreements have been concluded since the CIS was launched in December 1991. Among the most important documents is the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security of May 1992, which to date has been signed by nine CIS states (but not by Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine).

Military aspects of defence policy in Lithuania

It was indicated above that Lithuania faces a wide range of security challenges and risks, some of them indirectly military in nature. However, Lithuania's present economic difficulties have raised a rather fundamental question: are military forces needed *at all*?

During the initial stages of Lithuania's independence a large group of politicians argued that Lithuania did not need national defence forces, but that the establishment of border defence and national guard type forces, combined with a strong police force, would suffice. The assumption was made that Lithuania, as a small country, should seek other sources of security, and that it could not be expected to build its forces from scratch (when Russian troops left Lithuania they took every useful piece of military hardware which had not been damaged, and destroyed everything else). This position, however, was later abandoned and it was decided that the country should establish its own defence capabilities. The question which then arose was how to defend the country, and what should be the guiding principles?

The legal foundation for Lithuania's defence is Article 3 of the Constitution, which proclaims that no one shall limit or infringe upon national sovereignty or appropriate rights which belong to the entire nation; and that the nation and every citizen shall have the right to oppose anyone who uses force to encroach upon its independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order. Article 139 of the Constitution furthermore proclaims that the defence of Lithuania from foreign armed invasion is the right and duty of every citizen of Lithuania.

The highest *political* control over the armed forces is exercised by the President of the Republic, who is also the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces; the State Defence Council (also headed by the President) is the highest political institution dealing with national defence. The State Defence Council (which consists of the President, the Prime Minister, the chairman of the Parliament, the Minister of National Defence and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces), coordinates the activities of the institutions concerned (Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of the Interior, National Security Department) and is a consultative body which assists the President to analyse and solve problems related to national defence and security.

The second echelon of political control over the armed forces is exercised by the Minister of National Defence, who is a civilian appointed by the President. The Defence Minister oversees the administrative affairs of the armed forces, and also functions as the Prime Minister's senior adviser for defence policy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Lithuanian Armed Forces is appointed by the President (with the approval of the Parliament). The Commander-in-Chief is subordinated to the Minister of National Defence, and his main task is to prepare the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the Lithuanian Voluntary National Defence Service (VNDS, which are Home Guard-type forces) for the defence of the country and to oversee the day-to-day affairs of the military. He is assisted in this task by the Chief of Defence Staff. These are the principle actors and mechanisms of democratic control over the armed forces.

Despite the fact that Lithuania's National Security Concept and Defence Doctrine have not yet been adopted,⁽¹⁸⁾ the forces necessary to carry out its mission are now being created. There are only a few basic military concepts around which Lithuania's defence system will be built. One key principle is the concept of self-defence. This is reflected in the decision to introduce compulsory military service. The Voluntary National Defence Service, which was created in 1991, prepares Lithuanian citizens for self-defence on a mass scale, and constitutes a key element in ensuring cooperation among the armed forces and civilians. Citizens' self-defence is also seen as an essential means to reinforce the country's overall military capacity. Given Lithuania's geopolitical position, great importance is attached to border controls and territorial defence.

The VNDS functions as a 'territorial' force. In peacetime, it prepares conscripts for the army; in wartime, it would be responsible for mobilization and territorial defence. Armed resistance would be combined with civil disobedience, non-collaboration and other forms of non-violent defence. A State Border Police Department is subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and is responsible for the state's border security. A Civil Defence Department is subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence and is responsible for the protection of citizens in wartime and during crisis and emergency situations (and also in the event of nuclear accidents). Lithuania's total armed forces number approximately 7,000 men (army - 3,500, navy - 400, air force - 550, VNDS - 1,500 (plus about 12,000 volunteers), the Civil Defence Department - 500 and additional independent units such as the Ignalina nuclear power station's protection battalion).

The second key principle in Lithuania's defence system is deterrence, which would imply the ability to respond quickly to any military intrusion or intervention and inflict on a potential enemy significant material and moral damage. Lithuania's armed forces therefore have to be highly mobile, and possess modern weaponry as well as proper communications systems. Additionally, modern air traffic control/management, radar systems, air defence, intelligence and operational command, control and information systems are regarded as particularly significant.

The pillar of the Army, the 'Iron Wolf' Motorized Infantry Brigade, consists of eight battalions stationed across the country and equipped with light weapons and a small number of armoured combat vehicles. The Navy is equipped with 2 ex-Soviet *Grisha-III* (according to the NATO classification) light anti-submarine frigates and the Air

Force is equipped with more than 30 transport and several Czech made attack aircraft (mostly designed for training). In peacetime, the armed forces are called upon to monitor and protect state borders, territory, airspace and vital strategic points; they can also be asked to assist the civil authorities in the event of natural disasters for rescue missions, as well as participating in international military cooperation and peacekeeping missions. An important requirement for Lithuania's armed forces will be their ability to work closely together with West European countries in security and defence.

One of the main questions confronting Lithuanian policy-makers is how to restructure the armed forces to make them compatible with Western-type military forces. This is certainly not an easy or small task, especially since Lithuania is building its defence forces from scratch. Many Lithuanian officers who served for decades in the former Soviet Army tend to think and act according to old-fashioned Soviet military doctrine and are incapable of learning Western methods. Lithuania attaches the utmost importance to participation in international peacekeeping operations as an opportunity to get acquainted with Western organizational, legal, managerial and equipment standards. This explains why Lithuania is interested in acting under the aegis of the UN and/or OSCE in peacekeeping, as well as in cooperation with NATO and WEU in this field. What is more, peacekeeping is important as a common Baltic activity.

The establishment of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was under discussion for a quite a long time. Following a meeting of the three Baltic Defence Ministers on 13 September 1993, a trilateral declaration on cooperation in the field of security and defence was published, which also referred to future cooperation on a joint peacekeeping unit. On 15 February 1994, a meeting of the Baltic Defence Ministers took place in Riga, focusing on issues of Baltic defence cooperation, including the possible formation of BALTBAT. A trilateral working group was then established to draft the necessary documents for the formation of the battalion. It was also agreed that the Nordic countries and Great Britain would coordinate the training of this Baltic peacekeeping force. At the invitation of the Danish authorities a team of Lithuanian officers went to Denmark to observe troop training for peacekeeping (from 21 February - 5 March 1994); this was followed by a visit to Croatia for familiarisation with the activities of the Danish peacekeeping force on the ground. Moreover, on 17 July 1994, two Danish platoons arrived in Lithuania to conduct joint peacekeeping training. The first stage of the training lasted for two weeks at the training ground of the Lithuanian Army in Rukla. Early in August 1994, the trainees left for Denmark where training continued, after which the newly trained Baltic peacekeepers went as part of the Danish battalion to the UNPROFOR mission in Croatia. At the beginning of February 1995 this platoon was replaced by a second Lithuanian peacekeeping platoon.

The growing involvement of the Nordic states in the formation of BALTBAT was reflected in a communiqué on Nordic support for the formation of BALTBAT, signed by the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Defence Ministers on 3 May 1994. On 11 September 1994, the Defence Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Nordic and the Baltic states met in Copenhagen, where they agreed upon a Memorandum of Understanding concerning 'Cooperation on the Formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion'. It was agreed to provide support and assistance to the BALTBAT in such

areas as peacekeeping training, English language training, basic military training and UN unit training.⁽¹⁹⁾

A trilateral agreement between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania concerning the establishment and formation of a joint peacekeeping unit was finally signed by the three prime ministers during their meeting on 13 September 1994. Although the battalion is unlikely to develop into a major Baltic military force, BALTBAT stands out as a practical step towards coordinating Baltic defence efforts and bringing the Baltic states' defence system closer to those in the West. On 8 February 1995, the three presidents of the Baltic states officially opened the Baltic Battalion Training Centre in Adazi, Latvia. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas said that BALTBAT was not merely a military unit but that 'it expresses our wish to participate with other peacekeeping battalions all over the world,'⁽²⁰⁾ and was therefore also of major political importance.

In addition to forming an important element in the security and defence policies of the Baltic states, the creation of BALTBAT also conveys an important message to Moscow: the three Baltic states are now working together to manage their security, and Western states are providing essential assistance. These recent developments can hardly be a cause for Moscow to complain:⁽²¹⁾ BALTBAT is too small to pose a threat to Russia, and its mission involves peacekeeping and clearly serves no aggressive or offensive purpose. In many respects, the BALTBAT initiative sends a political message and is a very significant step towards integration in Western security structures.

Despite a very promising start, much remains to be done in order to establish a capable, democratically controlled, NATO-orientated defence system in Lithuania. The future of Lithuania's forces is one of the many controversial questions which remain to be solved. Lithuania's national security and defence doctrine is still under discussion, and the procurement of modern weapons is of course very expensive⁽²²⁾ (Lithuania's defence budget for 1995 is approximately Lit120 million, that is US\$30 million, and represents 3.8% of total state expenditure or only 0.58% of GDP). Because of the very low pay, a military career is not very popular. Opposition parties are blaming the Government, claiming that it does not pay sufficient attention to the country's defence needs, that army units are badly equipped and that military air control and management systems are not yet developed. Moreover, some political parties are now drawing up plans for reducing the defence budget and spending more money on education and social security.

Approaches to international organizations

Lithuania's security policy has from the very start included two main objectives. Firstly, in order to voice Lithuania's interests, Vilnius should expand its international presence in Europe and in the world by developing a wide network of international and regional relations, and by becoming an active partner or member of all the relevant economic, political and security organizations. By deepening its bilateral and multilateral cooperation on security and defence issues, Lithuania should make it understood that it does *not* regard itself as neutral, but that its priority is to become a full member of NATO and the EU/WEU. Secondly, and in parallel with Lithuania's first foreign policy objective, Vilnius should develop good relations with adjacent

countries such as the other Baltic and Nordic states, Poland, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

NATO

It should be made clear from the outset that Lithuania, like most other Central European states, views NATO as the main security guarantor in Europe. On the one hand, Lithuania fears a resurgent Russia while on the other being aware of the absence of an effective security architecture for the region. It is therefore not surprising that in this atmosphere of drift, Lithuania clings to the most visible symbol of support, and that it considers NATO membership as a crucial assurance against the unknown. By applying for NATO membership, Lithuania does not only seek to obtain security guarantees, but it thereby also expresses its willingness to contribute to European security in general.

Central European states place great value on the political support provided by NATO and its member states by creating a framework for jointly addressing security issues in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). For Lithuania, as well as for the other Baltic states, NACC is particularly important since it can make use of NATO assistance in the formation of the Baltic military structures, ensuring the application of the Western model of democratic control over the Baltic defence forces. During the process of cooperation and consultation, the main emphasis is being placed on security and the issues related to it, including peacekeeping, defence planning, democratic civil-military relations and civil-military interaction in air traffic control and management. Lithuania supports the NACC policy of ensuring transparency among the European states. But at the same time, NACC's limitations have become obvious, since it does not take into account the diversity of the area of the former Warsaw Pact where security problems and stability are concerned. All Central European countries therefore continue to ask whether, and to what extent, NATO is prepared to face new challenges and perform new functions, and to project its influence beyond its present treaty area.

It should also be mentioned that, for the Baltic states, close ties with NATO are not only important for strictly military or military-related reasons. In the Baltic region, it is clearly acknowledged that NATO's involvement also has a direct, and very positive, impact on the *economic* security of the Central European states, since close relations with NATO are seen as an element of stability and are therefore expected to make the region more attractive for Western investors.

For the Baltic states, there are two possibilities for 'joining' NATO: full membership, or an intermediate option which might include some form of security guarantee, possibly linked to a 'gradual' accession to the Alliance.⁽²³⁾ The latter option would mean that these 'newcomers' would receive at least 'soft' security guarantees in the beginning and pass through intermediate stages on the road to full membership. Lithuania has realized that its membership of NATO is not something that will happen in the near future and has therefore chosen to develop its political liaison with NATO and work actively in NACC and within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework.

Lithuania fully supports the Western position that Russia should not have a right of veto with regard to NATO enlargement, and at the same time Lithuania acknowledges the opinion of a *democratic* Russia concerning the possible entry of the Baltic states and other Central European countries into NATO. It is important to understand that in Russia the image of NATO as an alliance directed against Russia is still very widespread, which affects the attitude of Russian politicians towards NATO enlargement. The proposal to establish a NATO-Russian partnership outside the PfP framework as a way to increase mutual trust may well be able to dispel the view of NATO as an enemy that is held in Russia.

As was mentioned earlier, one of the main goals of Lithuania's security policy is to avoid isolation from the other Central European states while developing its relationship with NATO, the EU and WEU. Lithuania therefore supports the idea that the democratic Central European countries that aspire to NATO membership will be given equal opportunities to join. Lithuania is against any political differentiation and would view it as a very negative development if any reservations with respect to NATO membership were expressed regarding any Central European country. This would be understood as introducing categories of countries which are more prepared for NATO membership than others; it would also influence the relations of these states with the EU and WEU and would possibly send a signal to Russia that it could expand its influence in the region.

At the same time, it is clearly understood that NATO enlargement should be differentiated and assessed on a *case by case* basis. When there is a clear decision to admit other Central European countries into NATO, Lithuania would expect an explicit or implicit political commitment concerning Lithuania's membership of NATO, or even a clear timetable and a procedure for admission. This would at the same time be recognition by NATO that Lithuania, together with other Baltic and Central European states, had made significant progress towards establishing democratic institutions, a free market economy, civilian control of their armed forces, and the rule of law.

In President Brazauskas's letter of application of 4 January 1994 for membership of NATO it was emphasized that Lithuania was striving to '... contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.'⁽²⁴⁾ The position of the President has received support from the Seimas (Parliament), political parties and the general public: according to an opinion poll conducted by *Baltic Surveys*, a majority of the population (60%) approves of Lithuania strengthening its ties with NATO, while just 13% disapprove. Nearly as many (52%) voice their support for Lithuania's membership of the PfP and favour Lithuania's full membership of NATO should the opportunity arise (57%).

It is clear that NACC and PfP constitute the basic instruments of practical cooperation between NATO and their former adversaries in the East. Vilnius understands that the implementation of PfP is an intermediate step towards Lithuania's full membership of the Atlantic Alliance. From the outset, Lithuania welcomed the PfP initiative as a practical supplement to the NACC process, tailoring cooperative activities to the needs and aspirations of individual partners. This individual approach is especially valuable from the perspective of small states such as Lithuania, who have to develop their military structures from scratch. The Partnership gives them a chance to adapt their forces to NATO tasks, structures and standards, and to prepare themselves for

future membership of NATO by undertaking cooperative activities in military planning, training and joint military exercises. This will mean that Lithuania's armed forces will reach a high level of compatibility and can eventually join NATO troops in conducting peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions and other operations.

Of course, Vilnius recognizes the fact that many difficulties remain, and that Lithuania's military forces have a long way to go before they can operate jointly with their NATO counterparts. Nevertheless, it is clear that Vilnius is intent on reaching a sufficient level of interoperability with NATO through active participation in PfP activities. Lithuania introduced its Presentation Document to NATO officials during the NACC Ministerial meeting in Istanbul (in June 1994), and in November 1994 signed the Individual Partnership Programme, becoming the ninth partner state to do so. It should be mentioned that Lithuania was among the first countries to give a quick and positive response to NATO's PfP proposal, and President Brazauskas signed the PfP framework document on 27 January 1994.

Lithuania's armed forces participated in all three of the peacekeeping exercises in the PfP programme in the second half of 1994: in Poland (a detachment of the Lithuanian armed forces), in the Norwegian Sea (a Lithuanian light frigate), and in the Netherlands (a detachment of the Lithuanian armed forces). Lithuania and Poland were the only partner states which participated in all three exercises. In addition, Lithuania was among the first partner states to open an office at NATO Headquarters and to appoint a liaison officer. A Lithuanian military representative has been appointed to the Partnership Coordination Cell situated at Mons (Belgium).

At the moment, the new Lithuanian-NATO Individual Partnership programme is in preparation. Lithuania joined the PfP Planning and Review Process on 31 January 1995, which enables it to provide the Alliance with information on its armed forces, training centres, efforts towards standardization with NATO armed forces, as well as to receive comprehensive recommendations from NATO experts. In Lithuania's 1995 budget, resources have been assigned to finance the events within the framework of the PfP programme: Lit8.7 million (more than US\$2 million). Part of this sum will be used to create and maintain BALTBAT, to finance the activities within the PfP programme, and to finance peacekeeping operations in Croatia. This fully reflects the attitude of Vilnius towards the security priorities of the country.

The EU and WEU

Relations with the EU and WEU and active participation in the process of European integration aimed at full membership of these organisations, are among the top priorities of Lithuania's foreign policy. On 7 March 1994, the European Council of Ministers adopted the mandate to negotiate a free trade agreement between Lithuania and the EU. It was also confirmed that Brussels would negotiate a Europe Agreement with Lithuania, as well as with the other Baltic states, as soon as possible in recognition of the fact that the ultimate objective of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is membership of the European Union. The EU Corfu summit in June 1994 reaffirmed the Union's aim of incorporating the Baltic states. A free trade agreement between Lithuania and EU was signed on 18 July 1994, and entered into force on 1 January 1995. The opening of negotiations on a Europe Agreement took place in Brussels on 15 December 1994. The Europe Agreements concluded on 12 June 1995 between the

three Baltic states and the EU again indicate that with the entry of Sweden and Finland to the Union, the Baltic region is becoming increasingly important for the EU.

Lithuania very clearly welcomes the adoption of the pre-accession strategy for Central European countries that was agreed during the EU's Essen summit of December 1994, especially since the Baltic states were explicitly included in this process. This strategy aims at strengthening links with Central Europe to prepare them for future membership.

In December 1993, when EU foreign ministers welcomed the latest refinement of the European Stability Pact, aimed at strengthening political stability in Europe, it was decided to limit the geographical scope of the Pact to the nine Central European states that are eligible to join the EU in the future. This was welcomed by the three Baltic states, whose inclusion in the Stability Pact alongside the other Central European states was one more demonstration of the equal treatment they were being given. This EU initiative took the form of an opening conference, followed by bilateral negotiations between Central European countries on 'good-neighbour' accords. Some Central European countries have argued that 'closer *economic* links with the European Union are a more effective way of guaranteeing stability in Central Europe than a peace conference.'⁽²⁵⁾ Others have argued that 'the implication that, once the East Europeans had concluded bilateral treaties, these could be upheld by Brussels raised the spectre of security guarantees of the worst kind: ones given by an institution - the EU - that still has none of the necessary military instruments.'⁽²⁶⁾

Be that as it may, Lithuania, like many other Central European states, has welcomed this EU initiative and has expressed the belief that the Stability Pact could, indeed, 'stabilize' the situation in Central Europe. Lithuania's participation in the Pact contributes to the preparation for its membership of the EU, since it provides a good opportunity to inform the EU on the situation in the country and its relations with its closest neighbours. During the five meetings of the Baltic regional round-table which have taken place in the framework of the Stability Pact, Lithuania has stressed the importance of cross-border cooperation and good-neighbourliness, and also argued that the Pact should include terms of cooperation with the Kaliningrad enclave and the regulation of migration and transit by monitoring the eastern borders of the Baltic states. The inclusion of agreements between Lithuania and Poland,⁽²⁷⁾ with the other Baltic states,⁽²⁸⁾ Belarus⁽²⁹⁾ and Russia⁽³⁰⁾ clearly confirms the image of Lithuania as a stable country.

Following the adoption of the European Stability Pact on 20 March 1995 in Paris, it has become obvious that the Pact has demonstrated the effectiveness of the regional approach. It is now up to participants -- primarily the EU and the Central European states -- to maintain this momentum and to develop it further within the OSCE framework. By consolidating various confidence-building measures -- primarily good offices and assistance in implementing relevant bilateral agreements -- the OSCE should continue to foster stability in the area and contribute to the promotion of good-neighbourliness.

1994 was a very fruitful year for Lithuania regarding the development of its relations with WEU. Vilnius attaches special importance to its relations with WEU, and WEU's growing role within the new European security architecture is well understood. Closer

relations with WEU are seen as a way to extend the area of stability and security from Western Europe to Central Europe, and consultation and cooperation with WEU is considered by Central European states to be a first step towards integrating their countries into the European Union's future security structure. The initiative taken by WEU in establishing close institutional relations with all nine Central European states (i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) by granting them Associate Partner status on 9 May 1994 was a major step in that direction. This development has again highlighted the fact that WEU's policy towards Central Europe differs significantly from that pursued by NATO. The Alliance has adopted a policy of *not* formally differentiating among Central European countries and the Soviet successor states. WEU, on the other hand, reflects the policy of the EU, and has in practice followed the principle of differentiating in its relations with Central European states. WEU's decision to offer Associate Partner status to the nine Central European states is an indication of its policy of differentiation. This status enables these countries to attend the WEU Permanent Council meetings on a bi-weekly basis. Central European countries will be able to raise their own security concerns at Council meetings and contribute troops to WEU missions, but WEU does not provide Central Europe with security guarantees. All Associate Partners (together with Associate Members and Observers) are now actively contributing to the development of a so-called 'White Paper' on European defence which is currently under discussion in the WEU Permanent Council. Moreover, concrete politico-military relations (for instance the invitation to designate Forces Answerable to WEU, and to appoint a liaison officer to the WEU Planning Cell) are taking form. This clearly illustrates that Lithuania, together with the other Baltic countries, is in the mainstream of European integration and is able to make a positive contribution to Europe's security.

Regional cooperation

Although of the utmost importance, it is clear that close relations with European security institutions are only one element in the security policy of Lithuania. Bilateral and multilateral (*ad hoc*) cooperative arrangements to promote regional security are also important. Such loose arrangements could be used to create regional security zones. By signing a large number of agreements and treaties covering a broad area of interests -- ranging from trade and economic relations to environment and security -- all Central European states have tried to overcome the negative consequences of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. But it is of course impossible to establish a regional security arrangement without shared historical roots and common strategic interests. In this respect, the Baltic states should look to their Nordic neighbours as examples and for lessons on future Baltic regional cooperation. The Nordic states have never formed an economic or defence community, since the regional framework has been too narrow and their individual links with countries and organizations outside the region have been too strong and important. In the field of security they have constituted a system of mutual cooperation whilst pursuing different paths of alignment and non-alignment. The Nordic states have founded their military security `on a combination of deterrence and reassurance - with different points of gravity⁽³¹⁾: Finland and Sweden have been neutral, whereas Denmark and Norway have been under the NATO defence umbrella. But an important element of their regional Nordic cooperation has been `a common credo that no individual

Nordic state should question or complicate the security policy of any other, unless provoked.'

Regional cooperation among the Baltic states is an important element of Lithuania's foreign policy. Relations with Latvia and Estonia are coordinated within the Baltic Council, which has already resulted in initial efforts to create a Baltic common market and plans to coordinate the security policies of the three countries. Cooperation in security and defence among the Baltic states should be considered a major step towards ensuring regional stability and a way of making certain that the Baltic voice is heard in the rest of Europe. Cooperation between the Baltic states is expected to acquire a strong institutional foundation with the establishment of the Baltic Council of Ministers as the institution for intergovernmental collaboration.⁽³²⁾ The heads of government of the Baltic states are responsible for overall coordination of matters pertaining to Baltic cooperation within this Council. To assist in this, the Baltic Cooperation Committee, consisting of three high-ranking officials (one from each country) is being established. The ministers concerned also meet within the Baltic Council of Ministers and they are assisted by Committees of Senior Officials consisting of at least one representative from each Baltic country. At present there are 19 Committees of Senior Officials, including foreign affairs, defence and peacekeeping, transport, customs, border control, science and education, social affairs, crime prevention and information. According to the Baltic Council of Ministers Plan of Action for 1995, the three Baltic countries will cooperate in order to achieve harmonization of legislation, improve the level of exchange of information and coordinate activities within international organizations.

The Baltic states are also planning coordinated policies and actions to control their airspace and state borders on land, coastal and territorial waters (strengthening the Baltic border with Russia and the CIS is the top priority), combat terrorism and the smuggling of drugs and weapons, prevent uncontrolled migration, coordinate administrative activities and the training of BALTBAT's peacekeeping troops, and reorientate weapons, technical equipment, command, control and communication systems (as well as training) to Western standards. The Baltic states are also in the process of making their national security concepts and defence doctrines compatible.

Given the problems and threats shared by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, one would expect Baltic relations to be accorded a very high priority in all three states. In reality, however, since 1991 Baltic cooperation has failed to live up to its promise. The Baltic states have agreed to cooperate in the field of defence, gone a long way in establishing a free-trade zone and a common visa regime, and there are a few other cooperative projects. But closer cooperation on economic questions has proved unsuccessful, probably because the Baltic states are naturally economic competitors. Although the Baltic leaders understand that the changing face of European politics, in which participation in subregional groups opens up to the countries seeking membership of European institutions the possibility of being included in new initiatives for economic and political cooperation, they still hesitate.⁽³³⁾ On the contrary, they try consistently to avoid being grouped together, which, in their opinion, tends to minimize their individual problems and in some cases becomes a risk factor in the development of each of these states.⁽³⁴⁾

Another zone for regional cooperation is the Nordic Region. Common meetings of prime ministers and meetings of foreign and defence ministers have already taken place, and cooperation has started in such fields as the control of airspace, coastlines and borders, rescue operations in the Baltic Sea and technical assistance. Nordic countries are assisting the Baltic states because of cultural affinity and security concerns, as well as economic self-interest. They are aware that major instability in the Baltic states could well spill over to the Nordic countries and they also hope to benefit from increased trade if the huge Russian market opens up, using the Baltic states as their 'window on Russia'.

The third region of interest for Lithuania is the Visegrad Group, which includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Poland in particular, as Lithuania's immediate neighbour to the west, has become an important partner. Poland was one of Lithuania's active supporters during its quest for independence. Although relations between the two countries have been strained over minority rights and historical arguments over the status of Vilnius (and the Vilnius region), both sides have shown a willingness not to allow these issues to get in the way of establishing good-neighbourly relations. This was exemplified by the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation signed by Polish President Walesa and Lithuanian President Brazauskas in Vilnius on 26 April 1994. *Inter alia*, the Treaty states that Lithuania and Poland regret the conflicts that occurred between them after World War I and that they agree to cooperate in order to preserve and enhance security in Europe, paying special attention to security in the Baltic region.⁽³⁵⁾ It is hoped that the visit of President Brazauskas to Warsaw in February 1995 will have had a great impact on Lithuanian-Polish cooperation. During this visit it was agreed to hold consultations and cooperate in developing both countries' political and economic links with the EU, WEU and NATO.⁽³⁶⁾

Concluding remarks

It is evident that Lithuania, like the other Baltic states, has no security guarantees beyond international law and justice, which have never proven to be very effective in crisis situations. The top priority of Lithuanian security policy is therefore to strengthen state sovereignty and independence. Much remains to be done to convince the international community that these newcomers on the international scene will not pose problems and risks to Europe's overall stability and security. Lithuania should further develop its democratic institutions through free and democratic elections, securing human rights and rights of ethnic minorities and establishing democratic principles of control over the armed forces. These are key goals if Lithuania wants to maintain its image as a stable country. At present, lacking substantial security guarantees, all the Baltic states should be very active in establishing independent national forces that are in the near future capable of controlling their territories and in the long run doing as much as they can do to defend their territories in a reasonable way; this would be in the interests of the Baltic states themselves and the other states in the region. The ultimate aim is the ability to defend Lithuania's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the compatibility of its defence system with those of NATO countries. Lithuania should then seek to reduce and remove external tensions and risks, to establish good-neighbourly relations with all adjacent countries, and be prepared to accept its share of responsibility and contribution to European and world security and increasing cooperation between the Baltic states.

What Lithuania needs is to become a part of the new, increasingly integrated Europe as soon as possible. Lacking the military power to defend itself, Lithuania should base its security policy on active participation in all existing European institutions, including in future membership of NATO, the EU and WEU. All the overtures to the West made by Lithuania should be combined with a normalisation of relations with Russia and the further promotion of stability and confidence-building within the OSCE. This, in summary, is the only solution to Lithuania's security dilemma.

ESTONIA AND EUROPE: SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Mare Haab⁽³⁷⁾

Estonia is presumably no longer *terra incognita* on the international political landscape. Having been a part of the Russian Empire for roughly two and a half centuries - with only a comparatively short period of twenty-two years (1918-1940) during which it enjoyed independent statehood - the country has since the second half of the 1980s drawn the attention of the international community to its peaceful struggle to regain its independence. This cherished goal was attained on 20 August 1991, making Estonia one of the several newcomers to Europe.

In comparison with other Central European countries, Estonia (as well as the other two Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania), as a constituent part of the former Soviet Union, was in an unfavourable position as it set out to reform and build up the state and economy. Central European countries at least possessed the formal attributes of independent statehood. The Baltic countries, on the other hand, had to start from scratch, since they lacked working state institutions, a world-wide network of diplomatic services, armed forces and currencies, not to speak of a constitution or up-to-date legislation on a par with other democratic, market-economy societies.

Despite this unfavourable position, Estonia has already made significant progress in the process of nation state-building. This paper focuses on several aspects of this process, paying particular attention to the evolution of Estonia's security and defence policies since the abortive Moscow coup of August 1991. The aim of this paper is to provide an informative study on how Estonia's security and defence policy has developed under very volatile conditions of political, economic and social change. It will identify and analyse the security and defence options for a small state with comparatively modest democratic traditions, situated in a sensitive geopolitical position.

Military aspects of Estonia's defence policy

In order to clarify some of the basic elements of Estonia's contemporary security and defence policies, it is essential to recall the relevant experiences from the past. Due to its unique but also precarious geographic location - often referred to as between East and West - the territory of Estonia has been invaded and occupied by different powers over the last seven centuries. Since the beginning of the 13th century - when the Germans occupied the country - it has been ruled in turn by Germans, Swedes, Danes and Russians. Estonia did not exist as a sovereign country during that period. It was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that Estonia declared its independence, on 24 February 1918. Between 1918 and 1940, the Republic of Estonia was an independent state with diplomatic missions in ten European capitals as well as further afield. Estonia, a small European country with clearly defined borders and its own defence forces, was admitted to the League of Nations in September 1921.

Following the Nazi-Soviet agreement and the secret protocols in which Estonia was allocated to the Soviet Union, on 28 September 1939 Estonia was forced to sign the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, thus agreeing to Soviet military bases on its territory. In October about 25,000 Red Army troops crossed the Estonian border and established bases.⁽³⁸⁾ On 16 June 1940, Russia demanded that additional Soviet troops be stationed on Estonian territory and a new government be formed. In the two days which followed, some 90,000 Soviet troops entered the country, bringing the total to at least 115,000, and Estonia came under full military occupation.⁽³⁹⁾ The 1940 aggression was thoroughly prepared by Russia and according to some recently disclosed documents special emphasis was put on sealing off the Baltic states from the outside world and not allowing the `evacuation of the governments of those states.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The comparatively short period of national independence serves as the basis on which major elements of Estonia's present-day political thinking and decision-making are founded, in particular in the fields of security and defence. The idea of the historical and legal continuity of the nation-state is a central element in Estonia's political thinking, including the formulation of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. For example, Hain Rebas, the first Estonian Defence Minister, declared, after the September 1992 parliamentary elections, that `Estonia is going to recreate her armed forces, similar to the Estonian army of General Laidoner. This is the goal we are striving for.⁽⁴¹⁾ On 17 August 1990, a year before the actual restoration of independence, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia had adopted the Resolution on `Relations between the Republic of Estonia and the USSR' which resolved to proceed from the Tartu Peace Treaty of 2 February 1920 between Estonia and Russia and other valid treaties which were signed with the USSR before 16 June 1940.

Yet it is clear that the notion of historical and legal continuity has little significance where the concept of security is concerned, since the nature of `security' has undergone numerous analytical changes since the end of the Cold War. In the case of Estonia, most politicians have only just realised that the notion of security is a complex one, and that it consists of a wide range of aspects (military, political and economic, as well as environmental and societal). Simplistic, one-dimensional conceptions of `security' are still common in Estonia, and statements like `security for us is our sovereignty'⁽⁴²⁾ are frequently made. For that reason, military instruments and force are still considered the crucial elements in the defence of Estonian independence.

Since the restoration of independence, a wide debate has been conducted on the necessity of creating the country's own national army, and the size of such an army. Not very surprisingly, views on this matter have diverged widely. At the one extreme there have been the social democrats and representatives of some rural parties who have preferred small, highly professional units of border guards, national defence forces and a rescue service. At the other extreme, there have been the liberal democrats who have been advocating the clearest but most controversial alternative: Estonia should have a high-technology, highly trained professional army, but all men (and those women who wish it) must receive military training. Other political factions have argued for options lying between these extremes.

The idea that Estonia should build up its own army to defend the country and resist any foreign aggression has prevailed. The dominant way of thinking has followed these lines: 'If Estonia has a certain potential to resist an aggression, the aggressor would have certain hesitations; these hesitations will be stronger if the potential of Estonia to resist is increased.'⁽⁴³⁾ The idea of territorial defence as the supreme responsibility of the Army - an idea that is often accompanied by rather emotional statements that Estonia should offer military resistance even in the face of defeat - has been the main argument of the right-wing conservative and nationalist parties when coping with security and defence problems since the elections of September 1992 that brought them to power.

Preparations to create an army began directly after the restoration of independence. On 3 September 1991, the Estonian Supreme Council (the parliament of the time) adopted a decision to start the process of creating National Defence Forces.⁽⁴⁴⁾ It has taken more than two years for consensus to be reached on this matter, and on 9 March 1994 the State Assembly (the elected parliament) passed the law on 'Service in the Defence Forces.'⁽⁴⁵⁾ This law makes service in the Defence Forces compulsory for all male citizens of Estonia. Active military training for a period of 8 to 12 months (the exact period depending upon the kind of unit and the tasks of the military units in which conscripts serve) is required of young men aged between 18 and 27. Those who have finished their period of service enter the reserve forces and can be conscripted for military training in the future. The law also provides for alternative service of 15 months for those who have ideological or religious reasons for refusing military service. When the law was being discussed in the State Assembly, the deputies of the ruling right-wing coalition were of the opinion that the army should not consist of just 'workers and farmers',⁽⁴⁶⁾ and therefore university graduates are also supposed to serve (although they have the right to choose specific training programmes and may become reserve officers instead of doing the ordinary routine service).

As a complementary part of the National Defence Forces, the so-called Estonian Defence League was re-established on 17 February 1990 on principles which had already been formulated in 1918, when the principal goal was to maintain and develop Estonian self-defence and security. The Defence League is a grass-roots, volunteer (i.e. civilian) organisation which has already acted as a (basically unarmed) protection unit to safeguard essential strategic points (Parliament House, Television Tower, Press House) directly after the tragic events in Latvia and Lithuania in January 1991, and prior to the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991.

An overview of the development of Estonia's defence forces is given in the following table:

ESTONIA'S DEFENCE FORCES: MANPOWER 1920-93

YEAR	DEFENCE FORCES	DEFENCE LEAGUE
Winter 1920	86,000	119,000
Summer 1940	15,000	43,000
January 1992	85	-
December 1992	1,100	-
Summer 1993	2,000	6,500

Autumn 1994	3,000	7,500
January 1995	3,500	7,500

Source: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Headquarters of the Defence Forces

The Defence League has units stationed throughout the republic: the so-called Women's Home Defence (with more than 500 members), the so-called 'Homedaughters' (Kodutütred - a voluntary defence organisation for girls aged between 8 and 18, which has a little more than 1,000 members), and the so-called 'Young Eagles' (Noorkotkad - the voluntary defence organisation for boys from 8 to 18, which has approximately 2,000 members). All of these unarmed sub-organisations have been recreated on the principle of historical continuity and aim at strengthening patriotic feeling among the population.

At the same time, it should be emphasised that the process of passing the necessary legislation to regulate military and defence matters within the country and determine Estonia's position in these affairs at sub-regional, regional or European level, has been rather slow. A Ministry of Defence proposal concerning 'The Fundamentals of National Defence' was discussed in the Parliament on 15 March 1993, but was not officially approved by the State Assembly because it was considered incomplete. Meanwhile, no other document on Estonia's defence policy has emerged and discussion should therefore be based primarily on the 1993 proposal.

These 'Fundamentals of National Defence' call for Estonia to adopt the principle of 'total defence', the military basis of which is considered to be professional soldiers and highly trained reservists, as well as voluntary civilian forces (the Defence League). According to this document, the Estonian National Defence Forces consist of the Defence Army, the Border Guard and the Rescue Service. The peacetime composition of the Defence Forces is:

- land forces, consisting of 3 to 4 covering force units and several training subdivisions;
- air defence forces that consist of radar units, air defence artillery and missile units, and air squadrons, as well as
- naval forces that consist of a coast guard, marines and the Navy.

The minimum size of the Defence Army has been fixed at approximately 2,000 men. In addition, some 1,500 men should serve in border and coast guard posts, and another 300 in a militarised home defence unit (their task being to provide security at public events and combat criminal and terrorist activities),⁽⁴⁷⁾ and 200 in the rescue service.

According to the 'Fundamentals of National Defence', the Defence League forms the core of the reserve forces and participates in military exercises and assists in national rescue operations. The Defence League also forms an essential link between the armed forces and the Estonian people and develops, as well as practising, the concept of 'total defence'. This 'total defence' concept is defined in the document as a system

of united actions to fend off possible dangers by using all available state structures, its defence forces and 'the whole nation and its economic potential'. For the majority of the population the term 'total defence' is ambiguous, and it is not clearly understood how all Estonia's structures might be used to counter a possible attack. In order to verify the preparedness of the Defence Army, the Head of the Estonian Defence Forces declared an emergency situation on the night of 1 January 1995. The results of this exercise were revealing: it indicated that the communication systems are extremely poor and that 'in case of a possible attack the army would have been destroyed in their barracks.'⁽⁴⁸⁾

There are also a number of unanswered questions with respect to the division of labour between the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, as well as the exact obligations and responsibilities of the President who, according to the Constitution, is also the Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces. A similar lack of clarity in the division of tasks and responsibilities exists between the Government and the Parliament on security and defence matters. This has already given rise to a number of serious conflicts among the military themselves. As a rule, the conflicts reflect the different internal political ambitions of the opposing political powers of Estonia, and they reveal the danger that armed units whose loyalties are not clear can be more easily manipulated.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The lengthy period of international isolation, as well as the very limited number of experts in modern defence matters, explains the extremely modest degree of civilian control over security structures in Estonia at present. It also explains the continued legal vacuum in one of the country's most crucial political issues.

Estonia's defence forces are at present also confronted with a number of problems derived from the country's difficult economic conditions and the moral-ethical crisis in Estonian society. First, limited financial means have hampered the development of existing antiquated defence structures. In 1993, about 3 per cent of the already restricted national budget was allocated to defence; in 1994, it was around 5 per cent and in 1995, 4.7 per cent. A significant part of the defence budget is needed to reconstruct military installations inherited from the Soviet Army, which in most cases were handed over in extremely poor condition (generally having been deliberately ill-treated). This has left little money for equipment procurement.

Nevertheless, the Government has decided to purchase non-Russian armaments in line with the new national defence policy, based on the political decision to develop a Western orientation in the defence and military spheres. In 1993, the right-wing government sanctioned the purchase of arms and military equipment worth about US\$ 59 million from Israel; the 1994 budget allocated some US\$ 6-7 million for air defence equipment (out of a total defence budget for 1994 of approximately US\$ 20 million).⁽⁵⁰⁾ Unfortunately, these arms purchases have not so far been totally beneficial for Estonia. Tallinn has bought equipment that is partially obsolete (or unfit for use), which has only created the illusion that Estonia has rapidly been heavily equipped. This damaged the reputation of the Government, especially the Prime Minister, but the Government had to resign only in November 1994 after a number of other scandals involving the Prime Minister's activities. Ninety million Estonian Kroons (EEK) (approximately US\$ 8 million) from the estimated 1995 defence budget has to cover the arms purchase from Israel; this leaves only EEK 7 million for the rest of Estonia's 1995 defence expenditure.

Second, although the foundation has been laid for greater professionalism in the army (military schools and courses were established in the autumn of 1992), Estonia definitely lacks military leadership as well as experts with modern, up-to-date knowledge of military matters. At the beginning of 1994, there were 411 officers in the Estonian Defence Forces; Major-General Aleksander Einsele - a former US colonel - is the only general. In addition to this, the military has its roots in Estonia's Soviet heritage. A number of officers serving in the Defence Forces may still be considered in theory to be officers of the Soviet/Russian Army, as they received their military training from the Soviet Army and since the six-month additional courses for these officers have proved inadequate in improving their standards.

The basis for the third difficulty which the Estonian National Forces are facing is that young Estonians show little interest in army service. This is partly because Estonia does not have a military tradition, and partly because obligatory military service in the Soviet Army, in which conscripts encountered a lot of abuse and violence, has created a negative attitude towards the Army *per se*. Fourthly, within less than three years the Estonian Defence Ministry has had six Defence Ministers, which has definitely hampered the efficiency of routine ministerial work and has made cooperation between the different security structures difficult.

All of this has created a dilemma. On the one hand, Estonia's national security can hardly be solved by military means, considering the country's geopolitical position and socio-economic situation. On the other hand, a minimum level of military defence is needed in order to give a certain credibility to the policy of independence.

After independence: formulating a new foreign and security policy

Four years after the restoration of independence, the basic structures of Estonia's Army have been set in place, preconditions for the development of the new military élite have been created and the principal decisions on the course of Estonia's foreign policy have been made: Estonia wants to 'join Europe' in every sense. But although this end seems to be clear, the means to attain it are not so apparent.

There are several reasons for Estonia's decision to turn its back on the East and look to the West, among which fear of Russia is definitely predominant. As a result of this anxiety, several options have been considered for Estonia's security policy, ranging from neutrality or close relations with the Nordic Community and other Baltic Sea states (reverting to the idea of a new Hanseatic League), to the more obvious and straightforward option of strengthening relations with (and finally joining) NATO, the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU).⁽⁵¹⁾

The first proposals for an independent Estonian foreign and security policy were voiced as early as 1989, but they remained at the level of an exchange of views between the newly formed political parties and individual enthusiasts, and failed to achieve tangible results.⁽⁵²⁾ The idea shared by most political factions was that Estonia should seek to join Western organisations in an effort to balance Russia's power and stave off a possible future attack by Russia. Regional options have also been considered but the idea of establishing a Baltic Union of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has never been seen by any Baltic state as a viable alternative that will fulfil its

security needs. There are very definite historical reasons for scepticism over the effectiveness of such a union in security and defence issues. It is worth discussing these in detail, since they explain why developing cooperation between the Baltic countries is such an arduous process.

Baltic and Nordic cooperation: historical experience, current options

During the period between the two World Wars, effective cooperation among the Baltic states was modest, mainly because each country was facing different geopolitical problems. After gaining independence in 1918, Estonia and Latvia managed to settle territorial issues with their neighbours, whereas Lithuania was confronted with several territorial problems in the Klaipeda and Vilnius regions, which continued to trouble its relations with Poland and Germany. Latvia and Estonia have consistently refused to support Lithuania in this territorial dispute.

Feeling threatened by both Germany and Bolshevik Russia, Estonia started to search for possible allies and was actively looking for security guarantees. In November 1919, the Estonian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference proposed the idea of creating a Baltic League which would consist of a political and economic union among the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Norway), the Eastern Baltic Area (Finland, Estonia and Latvia) and the Southern Baltic Area (Lithuania and Poland). The aim of the League would have been to safeguard the freedom of the Baltic Sea, thereby avoiding any German or Russian dominance. However, this regional security system failed to emerge, partly due to the uncooperative stance taken by Lithuania, which stressed its 'exceptional position', being convinced of its better position under international law and refusing to act jointly with Estonia and Latvia.⁽⁵³⁾

The idea of a Baltic Union was put forward again during a meeting of prime ministers from Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Tartu (Estonia) in the autumn of 1919. A proposal was tabled (by Latvia) to create a union of five countries (which would also have included Poland, the strongest regional power at that time). Again it was Lithuania which blocked this proposal by declaring that it would only participate in such a union if all five countries were prepared to guarantee each other's territorial inviolability. Since Lithuania still had major problems with Poland over the status of Wilno (Vilnius), the conference ended without concrete results.⁽⁵⁴⁾ The insoluble Polish-Lithuanian controversy became the main reason why, after 1921, Lithuania refused to attend any further meetings in which Poland participated.

Without the participation of Lithuania, delegations from Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Poland signed a treaty in Warsaw on 17 March 1922, recognizing their common borders. The parties also agreed to coordinate their foreign policies, settle conflicts by peaceful means, help each other in the event of military attack, and not sign treaties with other countries that were directed against any of the signatories.⁽⁵⁵⁾ One year later, Estonia and Latvia signed treaties on the creation of an economic and customs union and military cooperation. These developments resulted in the further isolation of Lithuania from its neighbours in the Baltic region, which led Vilnius to seek the support of Soviet Russia; in 1926 a non-aggression treaty between Lithuania and the USSR was signed.

In February 1934, cooperation between Latvia and Estonia was strengthened by the creation of a military union, which laid the basis of the Baltic Entente. Fearing that Poland would be supported by Germany in its conflict over Wilno, Lithuania made a volte-face and decided to join the Baltic Entente; in September 1934 the Treaty of Concordia and Cooperation among all three Baltic states was signed in Geneva. The Baltic Entente covered foreign policy matters, science, education and culture. It should be noted that this treaty clearly stipulated that no support would be given to Lithuania in solving its 'specific' problems. However, the Entente did not survive very long and in the late 1930s slowly collapsed. Estonian leaders insisted on a pro-German, pro-Polish policy, and sharply condemned the new friendly attitudes of Latvia and Lithuania towards the USSR. All three Baltic states subsequently declared themselves neutral, which made the Baltic Entente practically irrelevant.

The different positions among the three Baltic states *vis-à-vis* the major powers in the region has made cooperation among these three states very difficult: Lithuania has regarded the USSR as an ally and protector in case of possible danger from Poland, whereas Estonia (and initially also Latvia) have considered the USSR as a potential security threat. In addition, 'each of the Baltic countries seemed to be convinced that its position was stronger than that of the others and that an alliance with the other Baltic countries would just jeopardise its own security.'⁽⁵⁶⁾

Although these historical experiences are far in the past, they are still clearly remembered and still influence the way in which the Baltic states view cooperation. Differences in history, culture, character and national interests, though not remarkable, have led to different ways of making policy, and different policies. To some extent one could even argue that, in their relations with the West and Western organizations, the Baltic states often see each other as competitors, and only to a limited extent as partners. Despite numerous joint Baltic meetings, each Baltic state has tried to solve its domestic and external problems on its own.

The most notable example has been the negotiations with Russia on troop withdrawals and the minority rights of Russian-speakers. Lithuania's small Russian minority and very liberal citizenship law put this country in a better position than Estonia or Latvia *vis-à-vis* Russia. Border issues are also different in character in each of the Baltic states. What is more, each Baltic state has developed a different approach towards Western Europe and its international organizations, which tends to reflect the priorities of these countries. For example, in March 1995 the deputy chairman of the foreign commission of the Lithuanian parliament, Algirdas Gričius, argued that although Vilnius should cooperate with the other Baltic states, it should not seek the joint entry of the Baltic states into NATO, since it could be more beneficial if Lithuania applied for NATO membership together with Poland.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Differences in the success of economic reform programmes have also to some extent hampered Baltic cooperation in the spheres of security and defence.

Despite these differences, since 1993 the Baltic states have started to take Baltic cooperation more seriously, and some progress has been made in developing joint structures for economic, political and defence cooperation. A Baltic free trade agreement was signed in September 1993, and the Baltic states have also agreed on a common visa regime with respect to the CIS countries and the coordination of

security activities. An agreement on establishing a customs union was signed by all three states in February 1995.

The creation of BALTBAT is the most tangible expression of Baltic cooperation in the military field. In February 1994, the Chiefs of Defence Staff decided to form a Baltic battalion as a future component of UN peacekeeping forces. On 3 June 1994, the Defence Ministers of Britain and the Scandinavian and Baltic states signed a memorandum specifying the objectives of BALTBAT. The Baltic states will receive financial assistance for basic infantry and peacekeeping training, as well as for logistics; BALTBAT troops will also receive language training (English) and a special headquarters will be located in the Latvian town of Adazi. On 13 September 1994, the agreement on the formation of BALTBAT was signed by the Prime Ministers of the Baltic states.

The framework of Baltic cooperation was strengthened by the creation of the Baltic Council of Ministers, on 13 June 1994, which was established to revitalise cooperation on matters of foreign, security and defence policy among the Baltic states, as well as on social and economic affairs, energy, communications, environment and culture. The Baltic Council aims to regulate cooperation in these areas through multilateral agreements.⁽⁵⁸⁾ The agreement on cooperation in the areas of defence and military relations signed by the three Baltic defence ministries in February 1995 is one concrete, successful outcome of the Baltic Council of Ministers. This trilateral agreement specifies the policies of the Baltic states towards the United Nations, NATO (and the Partnership for Peace programme), as well as WEU. It also outlines policies on the recruitment and training of armed forces personnel, the creation of an airspace control system, the exchange of information on security issues and the standardisation of armaments, equipment and logistics. Although it should be stressed that these measures are not to be seen as stages leading gradually towards the larger goal of a defence union, taken together with the creation of BALTBAT it seems to suggest that Baltic cooperation - which throughout history has in general been declarative rather than practical - might finally take off, particularly in the field of security and defence. Given these recent developments, one can only hope that history will not repeat itself, and that the Baltic states will develop the political will to establish an effective security community.

The establishment of close ties with the Nordic countries is seen by all Baltic states as an important and positive factor in developing a stable and secure Baltic region. However, it should be stressed that during the Cold War, each Nordic country developed its own individual security and defence policies. What is more, since Sweden and Finland are reconsidering their security and defence policies now that they have joined the EU (which is developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP), Estonia will find it difficult to become an integral part of the Nordic security area and participate fully in economic, political and security cooperation. Nevertheless, a close relationship with the Nordic countries is something that Estonia more or less takes for granted due to its shared historical roots and linguistic-cultural ties, as well as common security concerns over Russia.

NATO membership - from delusion to realism

During and directly after the 'national awakening' and 'singing revolution' of 1988/1989, establishing close ties with - and eventually joining - NATO became the priority issue for Estonia's political leaders.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Partly as a result of massive propaganda during the Soviet era, the Atlantic Alliance was perceived as the most powerful anti-Soviet structure. This made NATO all the more attractive, since the general feeling in Estonia was that the country should side with whatever body seemed to have a strong anti-Russian/Soviet connotation.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), established in December 1991, has been a useful framework allowing the Baltic states to become acquainted with the Alliance through joint activities and regular consultation in NATO sub-committees on matters of defence and security. The establishment of NACC has been welcomed by Tallinn, and this framework for dialogue between NATO and the post-communist countries has provided all the Baltic states with an increased feeling of security and protection.

NATO's initiative of January 1994, the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), is another attempt to ease the security concerns of the former Warsaw Pact countries, the Baltic states, Russia and the former Soviet republics, by offering all these countries a form of association with NATO. Although at first perceived with mild disappointment as being too 'soft' and providing insufficient security for the non-NATO countries, PfP was approved by the Baltic countries soon after its launch. On 11 January 1994, the presidents of the three Baltic states issued a joint statement in support of PfP, declaring that 'the programme opens up concrete possibilities for the development of cooperation between NATO and the Baltic States by being a gradual way for becoming NATO members.'⁽⁶⁰⁾ Estonia was accepted into the Partnership programme on 2 February 1994. On that occasion, Estonia's Foreign Minister Jüri Luik argued that 'Estonia is going to apply for NATO membership as soon as NATO is ready to accept this application.'⁽⁶¹⁾ A special commission of experts in Tallinn is formulating Estonia's exact needs and requirements within the PfP.

Cooperation within NACC and the PfP framework has also resulted in a more realistic understanding among Estonian politicians of NATO's main tasks and possibilities. During their frequent visits to the Baltic states, NATO officials have made it clear that the Alliance does not give security guarantees to non-member states, and that in order to obtain membership 'defence structures of new members must be compatible with those of NATO countries, including military doctrine, legislation, training, operational concepts, technology, etc.'⁽⁶²⁾ It is obvious that for Estonia it will be a long time before the country is able to meet these requirements.

The vast majority of Estonia's politicians, however, argue that NATO's enlargement must not be limited to the Visegrad countries only (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), since this would create a much feared 'grey area' between Russia and an enlarged NATO.⁽⁶³⁾ In February 1995 Ulo Nugis, the Speaker of the Estonian Parliament, emphasised: 'Having learned our lessons from history we have to acknowledge that without support from the rest of the world we are unable to defend Estonia. Our aspirations to integrate into Western economic, political and security structures are therefore understandable. In the time-consuming process of

joining the EU and NATO, Estonia must not lag behind the other Central European countries.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Indeed, placing Estonia and the other Baltic countries on a secondary list of potential NATO members could give the false impression that the Baltic states were again returning to Russia's 'sphere of influence'. It goes without saying that NATO should take into consideration Russia's reactions to any enlargement of the Alliance. However, as NATO officials have made clear, this should not give Moscow a veto over NATO's policy on enlargement. For most Baltic observers, however, it seems that NATO is treating Russia carefully and gently and is granting Russia special status in its relations with NATO. Russia's demands for special status are giving the Baltic states cause for concern; daily experiences give reason to believe that Moscow still cherishes imperialist ambitions.

Relations with the EU and WEU

Another direction in which Estonia has been looking in search of security is the EU and its defence counterpart, WEU. During the initial stage of Estonia's regained independence, relations with these organisations were not given top priority. But, after Estonia joined the Council of Europe in May 1993, and since Tallinn's general understanding has matured in respect to NATO (which has not offered membership), closer ties with the EU and WEU have ranked high on Estonia's foreign policy agenda.

Estonia's first government - formed after the September 1992 elections - declared EU membership as the long-term goal, and close ties with WEU were considered an essential element in the attainment of this aim. Estonia has set up a special working group which prepares its negotiations with the EU.⁽⁶⁵⁾ This working group has clearly indicated that 'Estonia should not become isolated as a periphery. Joining the European Union would contribute to the idea of Estonia becoming an economic bridge between Europe and Russia.'⁽⁶⁶⁾ It also called for the Baltic population to take a more active interest in the process of European integration. Still, a realistic and serious 'Eurodebate' has not yet started in Estonia. Most Estonian political parties have yet to formulate a clear policy *vis-à-vis* European integration. The basic arguments in favour of Estonia's integration into the EU concern the possibility of securing Estonia's independence and sovereignty as well as improving conditions for further economic development. Moreover, by joining the EU, Estonia would be eligible to apply to join WEU and hence acquire a security guarantee. Estonia could also use its geostrategic position by becoming an 'economic bridge' between a reformed Russia and other EU member states. Arguments against joining the EU focus on the loss of sovereignty and the threat which membership in an enlarged Union might pose to Estonia's still fragile national identity. It is also argued that EU membership would pose a threat to Estonia's agricultural sector, and that clear data on the economic effects of membership are still lacking.

In general, the liberal-conservative parties are the strongest supporters of Estonian membership of the EU, whereas the centre-left parties and trade unions are more cautious, arguing that joining the EU is not the only (though still one of the best) foreign policy options for Estonia. A thorough study of the positive and negative affects of joining the EU has therefore been suggested. The March 1995 parliamentary elections have clearly indicated that the Estonian electorate is by and large positive towards Estonia joining the process of European integration. The

November 1994 *Euro-barometer* opinion poll also indicated that 50% of Estonians approved of the course the country was following, whereas 33% disapproved. It should however be noted that the general attitude towards the EU is not as overwhelmingly favourable as it used to be. This can be explained by the fact that people have become better informed on European issues and are aware of the complexity of the integration process.

In 1994, Estonia successfully established close contacts with WEU. The Maastricht treaty's provisions on developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and making WEU the defence component of the EU have significantly increased WEU's role in European security, and hence made it more important in the eyes of the Baltic states. WEU's field of action is not limited geographically, and the organisation is therefore a suitable vehicle for stimulating international cooperation, as well as for regular dialogue on security and defence matters. In addition, it is not of minor importance for the Baltic states that WEU placed them on an equal footing with the other Central European countries by giving all these countries WEU Associate Partner status in May 1994. The Baltic states have seen this as a positive signal, especially since other international organisations seem more reluctant to treat the Baltic states in the same way as the other Central European countries, mainly due to the Baltic states' geopolitical position and status of former Soviet republics. WEU's Associate Partner status - which, *inter alia*, implies bi-weekly participation in the meetings of WEU's Permanent Council in Brussels - is regarded in Tallinn as a big step towards Estonia's integration in the European security structure, even though it does not provide the Baltic states with their much sought-after security guarantees.

Estonia's policy on Russia

The efforts of the Baltic states to establish close links with European institutions clearly reflect the prevailing feeling among the Balts that Russia still harbours expansionist ambitions, and that the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 has not fundamentally altered the character of its politico-military élite.

The historical record of Russia's policy towards the Baltic states is rather discouraging for Estonia, and Russia's current policy towards its neighbouring states gives every reason to be concerned. Russia's military doctrine - adopted in November 1993 - envisages the creation of a kind of buffer zone around its borders; the so-called 'near abroad' is seen as lying within the sphere of Russia's security interests. According to this document, Russia considers it vital for its security to maintain certain (often military) facilities on the territory of the former Soviet republics. Russia is therefore considered the main security risk for Estonia, or, as a leading official of the Estonian Defence Ministry, Hannes Walter, declared in December 1993: 'There is only one state in the world whose influential politicians have publicly threatened to eliminate the Republic of Estonia. To state bluntly that Estonia needs to defend itself against Russia is therefore not an unfriendly act but an acknowledgement of reality.'⁽⁶⁷⁾

It should be pointed out that, during the Soviet era, Estonia was among the most militarised areas. Close to two per cent of Estonia's territory was under the jurisdiction of the Russian military command, which included more than 500 military installations; approximately 132,000 Soviet troops (one third of the number stationed in East Germany) were based in Estonia - a country with a population of only 1.5

million.⁽⁶⁸⁾ In addition, the only Soviet training centre for the crews of strategic nuclear submarines - the 93rd Naval Training Centre - was located in Paldiski, 40 km from the capital of Estonia.

On 26 July 1994, after more than two years of negotiations involving nineteen rounds of talks between delegations from the two countries, the presidents of Estonia and Russia finally signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops. Unfortunately, this agreement contained several unclear passages and the mismanagement of the actual signing procedure has had a negative impact on Estonian-Russian relations. Since the draft agreement had not been officially approved by the Estonian Government prior to the signing procedure, the agreement was in direct contradiction with the Estonian Law on Conducting Foreign Affairs (Paragraph 19.2). What is more, the agreement includes a clause according to which both Russian and Estonian language versions of the document are to be signed. In reality, however, only the Russian copy was signed in Moscow; the Estonian language text was sent to President Yeltsin one month later, on 22 August. The agreement also includes conditions, mostly concerning rights and guarantees affecting retired Russian military personnel, which violate a number of Estonian laws. This agreement has placed Estonia in an extremely ambiguous situation. If the Estonian Parliament ratifies the agreement this would be in clear contradiction to the country's constitution (paragraphs 122, 123, 9). On the other hand, if the Parliament does not ratify the agreement, it might diminish Estonia's credibility as a reliable partner in international politics.

Although the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia has opened the way for a better relationship between Tallinn and Moscow, the fact that both sides can interpret the specific conditions of the agreement differently, in a way that is favourable to them, leaves much unresolved. In particular the issue of the more than 10,000 retired Russian military remains a bone of contention.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Moreover, despite the official withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia, a total of 1,000 military (not including the retired military) still remain in the country in violation of the Estonian-Russian agreements, and official notification has been given of the illegal presence of 381 troops.⁽⁷⁰⁾

Roughly a third of the Russian-speaking minority still consider their current status as psychologically unacceptable. This group perceive the Estonian laws on citizenship, language, non-citizens' rights and aliens (foreigners) as hostile, and a violation of their human rights. This situation remains a major source of tension in Russian-Estonian relations, especially since Russia's military doctrine also foresees the use of 'peacekeeping operations' in cases of 'threats to human rights' in the ex-USSR.⁽⁷¹⁾ Since the beginning of 1994, Moscow has issued a number of tough statements addressed to the Baltic countries about human rights violations against the ethnic Russians living there.⁽⁷²⁾

Since the adoption of the new Law on Citizenship on 19 January 1995 and the new Language Law on 21 February 1995, the Russian-speaking non-citizens' dissatisfaction with the Estonian authorities, especially in north-eastern Estonia where they comprise more than 90 per cent of the population, has again become more open. The Citizenship Law stipulates that an alien who wishes to receive Estonian citizenship must fulfil several conditions, including residence in Estonia on the basis

of a permanent residence permit for not less than five years. The final date for non-citizens to apply for the permanent residence permit has been fixed at 12 July 1995, a date which most non-citizens find unrealistic, given the complex and time-consuming bureaucratic procedure in processing the applications. Representatives of the population of foreign birth from the Russian-speaking community also demand that those who have lived in Estonia since before 1990 should automatically be granted permanent residence permits. Another condition of the Citizenship Law requires a basic knowledge of the Estonian language and the Constitution. According to a recent sociological study, almost ninety per cent of the Russian-speaking minority consider the language requirements to be the main obstacle to obtaining Estonian citizenship.⁽⁷³⁾

Despite these continuing problems, it should be added that the threat of the Russian minority in Estonia undermining the country's stability is minimal. A number of sociological studies indicate that the initial anti-Estonian, pro-Soviet/Russian behaviour of the Russian-speaking minority has now changed to a more positive attitude towards Estonia and Estonians. The main reasons are the relatively good economic conditions and social stability in Estonia, especially if compared with those in Russia. Among the population of slavonic origin there is a clear trend to apply for Estonian citizenship.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Concluding remarks

Estonia was in an uncomfortable and unstable security environment at the time it started to redefine its national identity and foreign and security policy in the early 1990s. After many decades of subjugation and international isolation, most Estonians harbour deeply rooted fears - and at times prejudices - *vis-à-vis* Russia.

It is clear that in formulating its security and defence policy, Estonia should be guided by rational, pragmatic arguments and try as far as possible not to be influenced by emotional reactions. Having established a solid relationship with Western international organisations, the Estonian authorities appear to have realised that they should not simply seek security from outside actors, but that effectively reorganising Estonia's security and defence is essential in order to attract outside support. Although the role of NATO, the EU, WEU and the OSCE in the Baltic region can hardly be underestimated, Estonia realizes that its security is best guaranteed by building a stable economy with sound social structures and by coming to terms with the fact that Russia is, and will remain, a neighbour with which it must establish working relations. To that end, Tallinn must accept that a certain number of compromises will have to be made. Most small states very clearly understand that they must be flexible and pragmatic in their relations with big, powerful neighbours. It will be important for Estonian politicians and scholars to understand that small countries like Estonia have limited scope for action.

A preparedness to make compromises does not, however, imply that Estonia and the other Baltic states must accept a relationship with Russia comparable to that which Finland had to accept during the Cold War. This would clearly be unacceptable in today's Estonia, since it would be a step backwards towards Estonia's previous position of dependence within the Soviet system. Yet it is obvious that Estonia has to make the best of the reality that it has a reforming and still unstable Russia for a

neighbour. Relationships, even among unequal partners, must, however, accommodate the needs and interests of both sides. It is therefore necessary for Russia also to show political willingness to base its relationship with Estonia on the principle of cooperation between sovereign states, and that Moscow does not time and again emphasise Estonia's semi-independence. Estonia must therefore continue to make efficient use of the international, regional and subregional institutions and organisations to draw the attention of the international community to Russia's frequent neo-imperialistic rhetoric *vis-à-vis* Estonia.

Since all three Baltic states basically face the same security challenges, Estonia should continue to strengthen effective joint action with Lithuania and Latvia, and should also develop its ties with the Visegrad states. Given the limited financial resources of these countries, working together (in, for example, BALTBAT), is the most viable option. Although Tallinn realizes that diverging historical experience and current national interests will make effective cooperation among Central European states difficult, it should be realized that if Central Europe were to speak with one voice, its voice might actually be heard, which would benefit them all. In particular, regional Baltic cooperation is essential, and its importance should not be underestimated by Estonia's decision-makers.

LATVIA AND EUROPE'S SECURITY STRUCTURES

Ilmars Viksne⁽⁷⁵⁾

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union's internal and external empire have left a security vacuum between Western Europe and Russia in which, in the mid-1990s, the Baltic states still find themselves. Political and economic instability in Russia, and the growing influence of revanchist political forces in that country, give great cause for concern in the Baltic states. Despite its many domestic problems, for Latvia the fear that Russia might want to restore its dominance in the Baltic region remains the gravest security threat. The main issue in this paper is therefore the problem of how Latvia (and the other Baltic states) might respond to the current security vacuum and ensure its independence. The paper discusses basic aspects of Latvia's foreign, security and defence policy, in particular its relations with European institutions, from which Latvia hopes to get support to safeguard its independence.

Latvia's long road to independence

It should always be clearly kept in mind that Latvia is a very small state, with a surface area of about 64,600 km² and only 2.65 million inhabitants, most of whom live in towns where Latvian citizens are often in a minority. Ethnic Latvians account for a mere 54% of the total population, while one third are ethnic Russians. Other relatively large minorities are Belarussians and Ukrainians.

Latvia's delicate geopolitical location on the eastern shore of the Baltic has always attracted foreign conquerors. In the past, Russia, Germany, Sweden and Poland have wanted to establish and consolidate their hegemony there. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing civil war in Russia, the first Latvian state was finally established. Representatives of various parties which wanted to rid themselves of foreign rule assembled in Riga on 17 November 1918, where they formed the People's Council (*Tautas padome*), which proclaimed the Republic of Latvia as a self-governing sovereign state. At the same time Latvia's provisional government was formed, which organised a liberation movement against foreign rule. For more than a year the Latvians fought bloody battles for independence against the troops of Soviet Russia, the Baltic Landeswehr, the Iron Division and the Bermont troops.⁽⁷⁶⁾

On 1 February 1920, Latvia concluded a ceasefire agreement with Soviet Russia, bringing the war in Latvia to an end. The Latvian army and its allies (French and British naval units and Estonian and Polish troops), had liberated the entire territory and, for the very first time, the Latvian people were able to determine their own future and fate. The following twenty years were a period of relative economic and cultural blossoming.

The expansionist policies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union abruptly interrupted the independence of the Latvian state. On 23 August 1939, Berlin and Moscow signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-aggression Pact and the secret supplementary protocol

which allocated the Baltic states to Russia.⁽⁷⁷⁾ After the fall of Poland, the Baltic states had little chance of protecting their independence and were well aware that no state would give them military assistance in the event of Soviet aggression. The governments of the Baltic states were unable to withstand Soviet political and military pressure and had to reconcile themselves to the setting up of Soviet military bases in the Baltic in the autumn of 1939. On 5 October 1939, Latvia and the Soviet Union signed what was called the 'mutual assistance pact', which signified that Latvia had lost any remaining power of resistance. In June 1940, Soviet troops occupied the entire territory of Latvia, which was followed by fifty years' loss of independence. Whether the Baltic states could and should have organised military resistance against the Soviet aggression, as Finland did at the time, is a question that has still not been fully answered.

In the first years after coming to power, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed *perestroika* and *glasnost*. One of the original aims of his domestic policy reforms was merely to improve the socialist system in the Soviet Union. But at the same time *glasnost* made it possible to hold political discussions about the 'mistaken actions' of previous Communist Party leaders, which soon led to an analysis of such deliberately criminal actions by the Communist Party as mass murder, deportations, and the cooperation between Stalin and Hitler in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This encouraged the growth of national movements in the Baltics and encouraged the Baltic peoples to mobilise non-violent resistance against Moscow's rule. The first mass demonstrations, which were held in 1988, called for more economic independence, indeed for the total independence of the Baltic republics. These demonstrations set off a 'legislative war' which focused on the legitimacy of Soviet rule over Latvia and the other Baltic states.

With its formal declaration of independence and subsequent withdrawal from the Soviet Union on 4 May 1990, Latvia stated that its membership of the Union forced on it by Stalin had been invalid from the start. The Supreme Council of the Latvian Republic began to enact its own laws, something that is the prerogative of an independent state. It came as no surprise that Moscow considered Latvia's declaration of independence unconstitutional and demanded the annulment of this document and its consequences. However, since Gorbachev wanted to preserve the democratic image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of West, blunt military force was not initially used in the Baltic region. However, the political and military leadership in Moscow clearly wanted to keep the Baltic states in the Soviet Union, and a number of front organisations were set up to support continued Soviet rule. These included so-called 'Interfront' organisations, which aimed at establishing a unitary state that would result in a 'socialist renewal'. Although 'Interfront' was presented as a 'workers' movement', it mainly included officers, demobilised military personnel from the Soviet Army, military college cadets, Russian party bureaucrats and their families. There were no restrictions on the Soviet troops' 'Interfront' activities and regular weapon training sessions were held in Soviet Army training centres for 'loyal civilians'.

Although the Baltic quest for independence was realised relatively peacefully, it nevertheless led to armed conflict in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991. The activities of the 'National Salvation Committee' against the democratically legitimised governments and acts of violence by OMON (Ministry of the Interior) troops were implicitly sanctioned by the Moscow leadership and supported by the regular Soviet

Army. The countless criminal offences committed by the OMON troops went unpunished because the leadership of the Soviet forces in Riga declared that military force might be used in the event of 'any hostilities' on the part of the Latvian Government against OMON. Nor was the August 1991 *putsch* by old-guard Communist forces restricted to Moscow: in Riga, OMON forces (together with Soviet Army troops) occupied all the key points (bridges, radio and television studios and telephone exchanges). As in the rest of the Soviet Union, however, this abortive *putsch* did not strengthen the Soviet grip on power, but was rather one of the catalysts which resulted in the final break-up of the USSR.

Aspects of Latvia's defence policy

The events of January and August 1991 made it clear to most Latvians that their national sovereignty required the establishment of their own military forces. On 23 August, immediately after the restoration of independence, the 'Law on the Home Guard' (*Zemessardze*) came into force. A few days later, on 29 August, the Latvian Government established the legal basis for the formation of voluntary defence troops under what was then the Department of Social Security. In September, so-called Home Guard units began to be set up and on 13 December 1991, by order of the Minister of Defence, a Latvian Defence Army was formed.

On 30 August 1994, the Latvian Government passed legislation governing the national armed forces; this provided for the formation of a defence staff and placed the Home Guard under the Minister of Defence. This was confirmed by the Latvian Parliament in the December 1994 Defence Law, which laid down guidelines for the Defence Forces and the Home Guard: the Defence Forces were to become highly professional units capable of reacting effectively to crises; the Home Guard was to act as a territorial army.

Latvia's 1994 Defence Law states that Riga does not regard any state as its enemy. The primary tasks of the national armed forces have been defined as follows:

- to ensure the inviolability and sovereignty of Latvia's territory, and
- to isolate and neutralise any enemy terrorist groups and groups hostile to the state within Latvia.

The strength of the Latvian national military forces (as at August 1994) is shown in the following table:

Personnel	Officers	Total
Defence forces	572	6,425
Border protection forces	300	3,662
Army	166	1,630
	59	899

Navy	47	234
Air and air defence forces		
	Professional	Total
	soldiers	
Home Guard	1,390	c. 16,500
Regiments of the Interior Ministry	c. 2,100	c. 2,100
Equipment		
Armoured personnel carriers		14
Small ships		20
Coastal radar equipment		6
Transport aircraft		2
L-410		2
An-2		
Mi-2 helicopters		6

Today the Defence Forces are already able to protect Latvia's land and sea borders; in the future, they will also be able to control national waters and airspace. The Defence Forces are also to be used for reacting to crises, resisting undercover attacks, protecting important state and military installations and giving assistance in the event of accidents and natural disasters. One of the Defence Forces' main tasks is to train recruits and prepare the mobile reserve.

The Border Protection Forces and Border Brigade are the largest and most important component of the Defence Forces. The Border Brigade is made up of seven battalions and two training centres. The consolidation of Latvian border controls remains a priority that directly affects the interests of both Latvia and the West. Economic crisis and the low standard of living in post-Communist Latvia have encouraged the rapid development and spread of organised crime. Criminal elements use the Baltic states for the illegal transit of drugs, arms and refugees. Latvia needs help if it is to introduce up-to-date technical equipment for the control and protection of border crossings and other sections of the border, which would reduce opportunities for smuggling and illegal border crossing.

For land operations, special battalions and two companies are being formed: a headquarters battalion, a reconnaissance and landing battalion, a motorised infantry battalion, an engineer company, an NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) defence company and two training centres. The manning level of these units varies from 28 to 97 per cent.

The Navy is divided into southern and central maritime sections, and there is also a coastal battalion. The southern maritime section and the coastal battalion are almost fully manned, while the more recently established central maritime section is at only 30% strength. Comparatively speaking, the air and air defence forces are the weakest component of national defence. They are not yet able to control and protect Latvian air space, mainly because they lack suitable weapons systems and the necessary infrastructure.

The Home Guard is a voluntary organisation whose units have been formed along territorial lines. It consists of a total of five brigades, with 35 battalions and a few autonomous companies and special units. Each battalion is divided into mobile combat units and security units. The Home Guard battalions cover the entire territory of Latvia; each battalion provides the cadre for a mobile reserve. In peacetime, the Home Guard also has several police functions. In the event of a large-scale attack on Latvia, the Home Guard, together with the Defence Forces, will defend the country; if faced with overwhelming pressure, these units will withdraw and their main task will be to keep at least a part of the country unoccupied to demonstrate that the Latvian Republic continues to exist and that the state's institutions are still working. The majority of the Home Guard will perform the duties of a territorial army with the aim of maintaining and, if possible, increasing control over the relevant regions of Latvia behind enemy lines. Using guerilla tactics, they will aim at disrupting the enemy's main supply routes.

In Latvia, in all, more than 25,000 men and women are now prepared to protect the independence of their country. Unfortunately, for the moment the poor financial and economic situation in Latvia does not permit it to procure the necessary weapons and equipment. The Home Guard in particular is facing a very difficult situation since only a quarter of its soldiers are equipped with personal weapons. Other sections of the national forces are in fact fully equipped with personal weapons, but they have very few machine guns, mortars or anti-tank weapons. There is also a constant shortage of ammunition for training.

Latvia's interest in Europe's security institutions

For Latvia and the other Baltic republics there are now only two realistic scenarios: either Russian economic, political and military interests will again predominate in the Baltic region, or Baltic independence will be consolidated with the politico-military support of the West. Close cooperation with (and eventually full membership of) NATO, WEU and the EU will give Latvia the security (and eventually the security guarantees) that are needed to resist being once again drawn into Russia's sphere of influence. But of course Latvia's membership of these European organisations is still some way off, and in the meantime solutions to some of the Baltic security challenges have to be found. Preventive diplomacy and crisis management in the Baltic region are therefore particularly important, and the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE -- the former CSCE) should not be underestimated.

Latvia, NATO and the need for Baltic defence cooperation

At its January 1994 summit in Brussels, NATO made a significant offer to strengthen security and military cooperation by proposing to all non-NATO OSCE countries a

'Partnership for Peace' (PfP). NATO also confirmed that membership of the Alliance would remain open to other European states that were in a position to promote the principles of the Partnership Agreement and who would contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. It was also clear that PfP did not contain NATO security guarantees for its new partners, although that was obviously the main aspiration of most Central European countries. The offer of a new partnership was the product of several conflicting interests in Europe and in the United States, and reflected the need to take account of Russia's apprehension over NATO's possible enlargement towards the East. The Partnership offer has received mixed responses in Central Europe: the Polish President Lech Walesa described it as 'blackmail, irresponsible, short-sighted and unrealistic . . . If the countries in transition are not integrated in the European economic and security structures, Moscow may be tempted once again to expand its sphere of influence towards Eastern Europe.'⁽⁷⁸⁾

In general, the Baltic states are more positive towards PfP, and they have welcomed the NATO initiative as a means of strengthening stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region through cooperation and joint action. For them, the Partnership for Peace proposal indicates that NATO has not (yet) made a clear distinction in Central Europe between countries which can join and countries which cannot (yet) join the Alliance. Riga realises that the four Visegrad countries are much better placed economically and politically than the Baltic states; the other Central European countries can also fall back on highly developed armed forces, which the Baltic states obviously still lack. It is therefore clear that at present the Baltic states do not fulfil the conditions for membership of the Alliance.

It is equally clear that the first 'wave' of NATO enlargement will most probably only cover the Visegrad countries, while the Baltic states would for the time being remain outside NATO's protective umbrella. In such a scenario, it is likely that Russia's policy towards the Baltic would become even more assertive, and might even turn aggressive. Given this alternative of selective enlargement, the Partnership for Peace (as long as no full membership of NATO is offered), gives the Baltic states a good alternative by which they can develop ties with NATO on the same footing as the other Central European countries.

Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs signed the Partnership for Peace framework document on 14 February 1994, and by the following June submitted to NATO a more concrete PfP presentation document. The Individual Partnership Programme was approved by Latvia and NATO on 8 February 1995. Although PfP, as already mentioned, does not offer a security guarantee, paragraph 8 of the framework document does stipulate that 'NATO will enter into consultations with every active participant in the partnership if that partner perceives any direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.'⁽⁷⁹⁾ For Riga this is of crucial importance, since it opens up the possibility of approaching NATO if there is a serious threat to Latvia's security.

The Baltic states have more confidence in the PfP now that Russia has not obtained from NATO the special status it had aimed for. This has prevented a new division of Europe and confirmed that every partner has the same rights and opportunities and that, regardless of its size or geographical or demographic features, it must assume the same obligations as the other partners. Latvia is encouraging the development of

closer relations between NATO and Russia, on condition that Moscow does not have the right to veto the enlargement of the Alliance, and that the international community will not grant Russia any 'special rights' to guarantee peace and security in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Like other Central European countries, Latvia considers PfP as a sort of antechamber for future NATO membership, since it does not exclude NATO's future enlargement but can be considered as a first and necessary step towards that end. As chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasised in his speech at the 31st Conference on Security Policy in Munich: 'the Alliance sees the growing cooperation and integration of the former Warsaw Pact countries as making a central contribution to the future security of the whole of Europe. To that end NATO has offered the states of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the successor states to the Soviet Union a 'Partnership for Peace'. This is a clear signal -- which is how the German Government also perceives it -- that NATO is open to new members.'⁽⁸⁰⁾

PfP offers these countries the opportunity to show NATO members that they qualify for membership of the Alliance. In this respect Riga hopes that NATO will not only look at the strategic relevance and position of a prospective member state, but will also take into account the activities of that country in the Partnership programme, including its performance in the PfP joint military exercises. The Baltic states have been given time to establish armed forces that can match the standards of NATO member states. It will be clear that NATO is unlikely to accept as a new member any state which cannot ensure its own defence; the Baltic states cannot just be 'consumers' of security. Latvia must therefore convince NATO that the preconditions for even closer cooperation are met by creating the appropriate political, economic, military and psychological conditions for their integration in NATO. Riga also acknowledges that NATO enlargement hinges on the agreement of *all* NATO's sixteen member states. It is therefore important that all those states understand that Baltic membership of the Alliance would be an asset for European stability. Latvia is therefore actively seeking support for its cause in Western Europe and North America, and is forming bilateral links with those countries to that end.

In anticipation of its membership of NATO, Riga is working towards building a network of military cooperation agreements with the West which can help Latvia to overcome its present difficulties. In January 1994, one such agreement was signed with Denmark. Military cooperation among the Baltic states themselves is of major strategic importance and is progressing steadily. On 27 February 1995, the Baltic ministers of defence signed a new tripartite agreement on cooperation in defence matters which included the establishment of a joint air space control and defence system.⁽⁸¹⁾ Only with Russia will military cooperation remain impossible, even unthinkable, for quite some time.

Military cooperation with the other Baltic republics (as well as with Western and Central Europe), is important for Latvia in helping to overcome the problems it now faces in creating combat-ready armed forces which can participate in planning, training and exercises and operations with NATO and/or individual NATO countries. The Baltic peacekeeping battalion -- BALTBAT -- set up jointly by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, assists Riga in its efforts to transform its armed forces and simultaneously constitutes an important component of Baltic relations with NATO. In

September 1994 the three Baltic states -- together with Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom -- signed a memorandum of understanding giving their support to the establishment of a Baltic peacekeeping battalion.⁽⁸²⁾ For a period of three years, these West European countries will assist BALTBAT in its preparations and training for peacekeeping missions. The training process will comprise:

- attendance on courses run by the Nordic peacekeeping troops;
- separate training of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian companies; and,
- training of all BALTBAT troops.

BALTBAT could also serve as a model for other Baltic units.

Despite its hopes and ambitions, the Latvian Government is well aware that Latvia will not be the first new member of NATO. Although it is concerned that selective NATO enlargement will divide the continent into a safe part and an insecure part, Riga will support every state that aspires to NATO membership, in the hope that at least *some* Central European states will be able to join Europe's area of stability in spite of Russia's objections. Riga realises that this will form a useful precedent for the Baltic states and a turning point in NATO's relations with Central Europe in general. In the meantime, however, Latvia also hopes that the Baltic states are not the *last* group of countries to become members, since this would certainly lead to an increase in the Baltic states' insecurity, which might result in the end of their *de facto* independence.

Latvia's relations with the EU and WEU

Latvia is clearly aware that security cannot only be guaranteed by military means and through joining NATO. Following the signing of the Maastricht treaty of 1991, the European Union (EU) now has both the policy instruments and the ambition to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and has included the Western European Union (WEU) in the European integration process. At the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, the EU committed itself to admitting new members from Central Europe.

On 18 July 1994, Latvia and the EU signed a free trade agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1995. This agreement will help widen and deepen economic relations between Latvia and the EU states. This is a very important factor in Riga's quest for independence, since what Latvia probably needs most today is an influx of foreign capital and direct investment to stimulate the economy. However, investment from the West is only trickling in because of the lack of confidence in Latvia's internal and external security. Gradual integration into the EU (and NATO) structures should therefore be considered as a confidence-building measure that is bound to boost Western investment in the Baltics. At the same time, access to Western markets is also important for Latvia, since it is the most significant prerequisite for the conversion of the Latvian economy to bring it up to Western standards.

An important objective of Latvia's foreign policy was to become an associate of the EU by signing a Europe Agreement, as this would be seen as an important next step

towards Latvia's integration into the West. The Baltic states are extremely pleased that such agreements were signed on 12 June 1995. This will establish a political dialogue and cooperation in the areas of finance, education and culture, and will provide favourable conditions for trade in agricultural produce. The Agreement sets a period of ten years' preparation for entry into the EU. Latvia also expects that closer economic and political links with the European Union will imply that Brussels takes Latvia's security problems more seriously and that Riga will become involved in the Union's CFSP.

The prospect of a Europe Agreement being concluded was also an important reason for WEU to strengthen its association with all three Baltic states.⁽⁸³⁾ As the defence component of the European integration process, WEU was looking ahead to the enlargement of the EU to include all nine Central European countries when it decided to include the Baltic states in the enlarged WEU 'family'. At the WEU Kirchberg Ministerial Meeting of May 1994, the nine Central European countries were offered the new status of WEU Associate Partner. As an Associate Partner, Latvia participates in the WEU's Permanent Council in Brussels on a bi-weekly basis and has the right to speak during its meetings (but without being able to block decisions that require a consensus among member states). Like other Central European countries, Latvia is included in some of the WEU's working groups, which implies that it is closely involved in discussion among all European countries on the development of Europe's security and defence structure. Latvia will also be able to liaise with the WEU's Planning Cell, whose tasks include preparing contingency plans for military operations and keeping up-dated lists of the military forces that can be used under WEU auspices. Associate Partners can also take part in WEU military operations, for which they would make troops available on the same basis as full members (provided there is agreement by the majority of member states).

Latvia's associate partnership of WEU is a very important practical step towards further integration in Europe's security structures and offers Riga the opportunity to voice its security concerns within one of the principal West European defence organisations. The Latvian Government also sees the development of closer relations with WEU as part of Latvia's endeavour to obtain full NATO membership, even by a circuitous route.⁽⁸⁴⁾

WEU membership is of course closely related to membership of the EU. Although the EU is not a collective defence organisation that provides its member states with a security guarantee, there is no doubt that its members achieve greater security *indirectly* through close cooperation in foreign and security policy. It is almost inconceivable that in times of crisis EU member states would not assist each other politically, as well as militarily.

Russia's policy towards Latvia: the need for preventive diplomacy

Since the collapse of the USSR, many Russians have continued to perceive the other Soviet successor states as lying within Moscow's natural sphere of influence. It also often seems that the vast majority of Russians still consider the great multinational Soviet empire as their own state, and not as a defunct structure of the past. This can be easily explained, since for decades the Russian people in the Soviet Union were (obviously successfully) persuaded that they had an international obligation to

introduce their education, culture and science into the other national republics and to promote economic progress through collectivisation. During the Soviet period, the Russian language supplanted other national languages in political, economic and scientific affairs.

It should also be recalled that, although in 1991 the Baltic states recovered their independence, as part of the same process the Russians did actually lose their own state: the USSR. The territory of today's Russian Federation has been reduced to roughly the mid-seventeenth century borders of the Russian Empire before Ukraine was incorporated (in 1654). However, the difference is that the Russia of today has direct access to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Japan. But, at the same time, the Russian-speaking population outside the borders of the Russian Federation has suddenly found itself 'abroad', deprived of its former privileges.

Since 1992, Russian rhetoric and policy have tended towards nostalgia and revisionism. The electoral campaign preceding the December 1993 presidential elections, as well as its outcome, provided evidence of the sadness felt by the majority of Russians at the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In foreign policy, liberal parties such as Russia's Choice have in general distanced themselves from the Soviet imperialist past. But during the 1993 electoral campaign, the majority of the political movements were clearly farther to the right, in the sense that they defined Russia's interests and policies in traditional imperialist concepts and continued to identify the Russian nation with an empire. As one observer argued: 'For us the concept of restoration -- the return to our own national history -- is the equivalent of salvation, the preservation of our own political nation and national dignity. There will not be a new history, a new Russia. Either we return to our national history, preserve our Russian history, our spiritual and economic independence, or we dissolve in this world, like people with no fatherland, no ancestry, no memory, no roots.'⁽⁸⁵⁾

Russian Government officials deny that these changes in Russia's foreign policy rhetoric signify a return to traditional imperial ambitions. At the same time, however, Moscow is now tending to call for a new type of relationship with *all* the former Soviet Union Republics,⁽⁸⁶⁾ which it now refers to as its 'near abroad', a region which includes the Baltic states. Moscow's long-term strategic ambitions in the former Soviet Union are still unclear, but the widely-shared view in Russia that the newly independent states have no historical legitimacy implies that there is no obstacle to re-incorporating them in a restored Russian empire or commonwealth.

In order to differentiate themselves from the other ex-Soviet republics, the Baltic states have refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the organisation which succeeded the USSR in 1991. Latvia's policy towards the Commonwealth is to wait and see whether the CIS facilitates its relations with the Soviet successor states; membership of the CIS itself is, of course, excluded. It is clearly acknowledged that the CIS region is very unstable, and that its future course is unpredictable. Russia has consistently tried to draw the Baltic states closer to the Commonwealth. For example, at the Alma Ata summit of February 1995, CIS leaders called for involvement of the Baltic states in the CIS joint air defence system (which of course includes the Skrunda radar station), even though Latvia has made it clear in the past that it wants to remain outside CIS structures. Moscow has also consistently used various forms of political leverage (for instance the pace of Russian troop

withdrawals and the continued Russian military operation of the Skrunda station, as well as the demand for full citizenship of the entire Russian-speaking population -- see below) to influence Latvia's domestic and foreign policies.

Some Russian officials have also indicated that Moscow will not in any circumstances be prepared to give up control over the states that emerged on the territory of the Soviet Union, nor will it allow any interference by third parties in the affairs of the entire region. In October 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared that the power vacuum created after the collapse of the USSR could and should only be filled by Russia, and that no international organisation or group of states could replace Russian peacekeeping efforts in the post-Soviet area.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Moscow has consistently tried to maintain or even increase the number of its military bases in the former Soviet Union, and it is often argued that the more military bases are established on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the sooner economic and military union can be restored.⁽⁸⁸⁾

It should be stressed that this approach may also well apply to Russia's military presence in the Baltic region: President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree on 5 April 1994 which stressed the need to maintain Russian military bases in the CIS *and Latvia (sic)*. The Latvian Government immediately declared that Riga `never has and never will agree to the establishment of Russian military bases in Latvia or to the testing of new weapons and military technology on Latvian soil.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Following protests from the Baltic states and the West, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defence Minister Grachev dissociated themselves from this decree, and later apologised for the `technical error' of including Latvia in this specific document.

Latvia's policy towards its Russian-speaking minority

As long as the contentious issue of the Russians and the `Russian-speaking population' on its territory remains unresolved, Latvian-Russian relations will remain problematic. It should be stressed that this problem is partly self-induced, since the migration of Russians to Latvia during the Soviet era was a planned process of what can only be called `gradual colonisation'. According to 1992 estimates, out of a total population of 2.65 million inhabitants, only 1.39 million are Latvian, 902,000 are Russian, and the rest either Belarussian (117,000), Ukrainian (89,000), Polish (60,000) or Lithuanian (34,000). In the ten major Latvian cities, including the capital, Riga, Russians form almost 50% of the population, while Latvians account for little more than one third of the population. This is of course a quite extraordinary situation, and it largely explains why ethnic Latvians consider it at times difficult to maintain their national identity in their own country. This may sound somewhat strange and perhaps even paradoxical, but it is unfortunately the case in Latvia today.

The international community has devoted close attention to the problems which Latvia has experienced in drafting its citizenship law. The discussion on this law started in the summer of 1989, immediately after the adoption of the declaration of Latvia's independence in July of that year. In October 1991 the Supreme Council adopted legislation on citizenship (automatically restoring citizenship to those who had been citizens of the pre-World War II Republic and their descendants), whereas other residents had to apply for naturalisation which required, *inter alia*, 16 years' residence in Latvia and a basic knowledge of the Latvian language. This was a

temporary measure, and further drafts of the citizenship and naturalisation laws have been studied and discussed by the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe. The OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoep, has been closely involved in preparatory discussions on the exact details of the requirements for citizenship (for the OSCE's role, see below).

A citizenship law was finally adopted by the Saeima (Parliament) on 22 July 1994. It stipulates that, as of 1 January 1996, persons *born in Latvia* may apply for citizenship; from 2001, application will be open to persons *not* born in Latvia. Citizenship can be obtained by persons with five years' permanent residence (since 4 May 1990) and who have a legal income in Latvia; a basic knowledge of the Latvian language, the Constitution, the main rights and duties of the citizen and the history of Latvia are required. Applicants furthermore have to testify their loyalty to the Republic of Latvia.

The EU, under Germany's presidency, 'welcomed' the adoption of the new Latvian citizenship law on 29 July 1994, noting that Latvia had taken account of 'the recommendations of the OSCE and the Council of Europe and the requests of the EU in the law.'⁽⁹⁰⁾ With the adoption of the citizenship law, the last obstacle to Latvia's membership of the Council of Europe was removed and Latvia joined that organisation on 6 February 1995. The Latvian Government expressed its gratitude to the West European states for recognising the law and hopes, especially in view of criticism from Moscow, that it will obtain support from the European security institutions for the implementation of the law.

Despite these fairly loose requirements for citizenship and the absence of a quota for Russian applications, it is clear that Latvia's relations with Russia will remain severely affected by the issue of citizenship, primarily because of the almost one million Russian-speakers living in Latvia. The Russian Government is unlikely to abandon its call for unrestricted Latvian citizenship for the entire Russian-speaking population. Moscow has even threatened to impose 'economic measures' if the law is not changed, and may offer Russian citizenship to all Russian-speakers living in Latvia who do not immediately acquire Latvian citizenship. The problem is that Moscow's call for further liberalisation of the citizenship law will only encourage Latvian nationalists to demand the expulsion of ethnic Russians from Latvia and thereby contribute to the polarisation of Latvian society.

The role of the OSCE

Given Latvia's precarious security situation and its modest national defence capabilities, the OSCE is of major importance for the maintenance of stability in the Baltic region, especially since the OSCE offers a mechanism for conflict prevention which can be used to neutralise potential crises and prevent possible escalation. The Latvian Government regards the OSCE as a basic component of the European security architecture, and will want to make more effective use of its structures in the years ahead. Following the agreements of 30 April 1994 on the withdrawal of Russian troops, the Riga government is hoping to obtain OSCE support for monitoring total compliance with these agreements. In May 1994 the President of the Latvian Parliament, A. Gorbunov, stated: 'The Latvians fear that a future Russian government could ignore the agreement on the withdrawal of the missile defence facility at

Skrunda. That is why it would be desirable for the CSCE to make a kind of declaration that it would guarantee that Russia keeps its promise regarding the withdrawal.⁽⁹¹⁾

Prior to Latvian independence an estimated total of 100,000 Red Army troops were stationed in Latvia. Negotiations on the withdrawal of these troops have proved to be very difficult, partly because the Russian authorities have had difficulty in finding proper housing for them, but mainly for politico-strategic reasons. Moscow has also linked the withdrawal of troops (from Latvia as well as from the other Baltic states) to the guarantee of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in the region. In August 1993, the last Soviet ship left the naval base at Bolderaja, but the Russian delegation continued to resist a complete withdrawal of troops unless it was granted continued control over the Skrunda early warning radar station as a *quid pro quo*. In February 1994 it was finally agreed that Russia would continue to lease the Skrunda station until 31 August 1998 (and for a further 18 months for the dismantling of the station). Paragraphs 14(1) and 15(1-3) of the Latvian-Russian agreement on the lease of the Skrunda radar station specifically call for the participation of OSCE representatives in monitoring Russian troop withdrawals. A joint committee, made up of an equal number of representatives of each side, as well as OSCE representatives, has been set up to observe and coordinate compliance with this agreement. This joint committee is to resolve any questions related to the implementation of the agreement, and both sides must adhere to its decisions. OSCE inspectors can observe and check the current operation and the subsequent dismantling of the Skrunda early warning station.

For the time being, a maximum of 599 military specialists and 199 'civilian technicians' will operate the radar station in addition to 89 military security guards (and their families) will remain in Latvia. It has been agreed that during its limited period of operation, Russia will not be allowed to modernise the radar station. It should be stressed that the radar's military value is very limited. The reasons why Russia wishes to maintain control over the station are therefore more politico-strategic: Russia sees it as a way of maintaining a military presence in Latvia and thus having a certain political leverage over the country's foreign and security policies.

The OSCE can also play a useful role in the question of the status of retired Soviet officers and their families in Latvia. In 1994, Riga made a concession by signing an agreement on the social rights (i.e. pensions, property and medical care) of members of this specific group who may want to remain in Latvia. The OSCE mission in Latvia will monitor whether the Latvian Government is fulfilling its commitments *vis-à-vis* these retired Soviet Army officers. The OSCE might also assist the Latvian and Russian authorities to create favourable circumstances for the *voluntary* return to Russia of the 'Russian-speaking population', and of Russian citizens in particular. The OSCE, with its relatively low profile, will continue to play a useful role in bringing Latvia and Russia together to work out compromises on these delicate minority issues.

The OSCE's role in preventive diplomacy in the Baltic region will only increase now that the European Stability Pact (which was concluded in March 1995 in Paris) has tasked the OSCE to monitor the 14 agreements which Latvia has concluded in this context, including the agreements on the withdrawal of Russian troops. In this respect,

the Stability Pact has been a useful exercise for Latvia, and it has certainly improved the Latvian-Russian dialogue.

The OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation, set up in September 1992, makes the OSCE of special relevance to security in the Baltic region. In its 'Programme for Immediate Action', the Forum for Security Cooperation focuses on the harmonisation of obligations agreed upon by OSCE states under various international agreements concerning conventional armaments in Europe and the elaboration of a politico-military code of conduct for the guidance of inter-state and intra-state relations in the OSCE area. This makes the OSCE Forum especially relevant for the Baltic region, where there are large differences in the military potential of the Baltic states and their neighbours. For instance, the number of Russian troops stationed in Kaliningrad alone is ten times the total number of soldiers in the three Baltic states, and there is of course no real comparison between the weapons of the Baltic states and those of Russia. That is why the Baltic states are encouraging the formulation of regional disarmament and arms limitation measures in order to create military stability in the region.

Concluding remarks

The main goals of the Latvian Government, reflected in its foreign and security policy, are to maintain and reinforce Latvian independence by strengthening ties with European countries and Western international organisations. Simultaneously, Latvia is aiming at improving relations with Russia and the other Soviet successor states -- although not, of course, at any price.

Of the fifteen former Soviet Republics, only the Baltic states have remained outside the CIS and have clearly expressed their wish to become integrated in the West. This has been acknowledged by the West European countries, and the fact that Latvia and the other Baltic states have now signed Europe Agreements with the EU and have already acquired Associate Partner status within WEU underlines their European vocation.

However, it should also be acknowledged that it is not at all guaranteed that the future of the Baltic states will lie in the Western, stable part of Europe, since objectively the conditions do exist for the Baltic states to return to the Russian sphere of influence: a very high proportion of Russian-speakers in the population of Latvia and Estonia; the presence of powerful Moscow-oriented post-communist parties; and the strong economic dependence of the Baltic states on Russian supplies of energy and strategically significant raw materials.

Today the West is understandably reluctant to give a clear security guarantee to the Baltic states. In the meantime, Latvia can only build up its security step by step on the assumption that if Latvia strengthens its relations with the international organisations this will consolidate its security position in Europe. A wide, intensive network of bilateral relations will facilitate Latvia's integration in European security structures and, vice versa, effective action within the European organisations will encourage wide-ranging mutual cooperation. For the coming years that is an acceptable road for Latvia, one that will lead to the full integration of the Baltic states into Europe's security structures.

1. Peter van Ham is a research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of WEU.
2. *The Times*, 19 April 1995.
3. Carl Bildt, 'The Baltic Litmus Test', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1994, vol. 73, no. 5, p. 72.
4. Eitvydas Bajarnas is Deputy Head of the Multilateral Relations Division of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. O.F. Knudsen, 'Vulnerabilities of the Baltic States', presentation at the conference 'Baltic and Nordic Security' (pre-print, published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 1993), p. 23.
6. J. Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', *Adelphi Paper 272* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1992), p. 66.
7. Russia remains one of Lithuania's biggest trading partners: in 1994 exports to Russia represented 26.2% of total exports, and imports from Russia 43.9% of Lithuania's imports. It should be mentioned that due to the double taxation policy exports to Russia decreased significantly compared with 1993, and Lithuanian companies were forced to search for trading partners in the West.
8. M. Bratersky, 'NATO in the Eyes of Russian', presentation in the *NATO Opinion Seminar*, 30 January 1995, pp. 7-8.
9. C. Bildt, 'The Baltic Litmus Test', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1994, vol. 73, no. 5, p. 72.
10. Russia could also reach the Kaliningrad region through Poland or by sea (from St Petersburg).
11. For more details, see opening statement by A. Januska, Head of the Lithuanian Delegation to the CSCE Review Conference, Budapest, 10 October 1994.
12. S.A. Karaganov, 'Russia: the New Foreign Policy and Security Agenda', *London Defence Studies*, no. 12, 1992, p. 3.
13. J. Palmer, 'Russia's action may harm its NATO ties', *The Guardian*, 5 January 1995.
14. S.A. Karaganov, in 'Russia and the West: testing the partnership?', *Moscow News* (English edition), no. 7-8, 25 February - 3 March 1994.
15. J. Lough, 'Defining Russia's Relations with Neighbouring States', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 20, 14 May 1993, p. 54.
16. S.A. Karaganov, op. cit., p. 35.

17. A. Pushkov, 'The West and Russia get rid of newly acquired complexes', *Moscow News*(English edition), no. 12, 25-31 March 1994. See also S. Crow, 'Russia promotes the CIS as an international organisation', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994.

18. In the summer of 1993, the first draft of the National Security Concept, prepared by an *ad hoc* working group appointed by the President, was presented to Parliament. In addition, in the middle of 1994, a draft of the National Security and Defence Concept, which was prepared by the parliamentary opposition, was presented. At the end of 1994, these two drafts were discussed in Parliament and it was decided to create an *ad hoc* working group consisting of representatives of all parliamentary factions. This group promised to finalise the Lithuanian National Defence Concept based on a consensus among the different political orientations. This work is not yet finished. At the same time, work is continuing on the Defence Doctrine.

19. Two interesting characteristics of BALTBAT should be mentioned. First, there is *one* operating language -- English -- so there will be few problems in communications. Second, only one country -- Denmark -- has been assigned the role of coordinator.

20. P. Birzulis, 'BALTBAT finds a home', *The Baltic Independent*, vol. 5, no. 250, 10-16 February, 1995.

21. 'Good idea in the Baltics', *The Wall Street Journal*, 22 September 1994.

22. Even the Clinton administration's recent decision to permit sales of fighter aircraft, tanks and other sophisticated weapons to ten Central European states (including Lithuania) was met rather pessimistically in Lithuania. This is quite understandable: proposed arms sales will hardly be possible without substantial foreign credits. Since the cost of one tank is presently about US\$2 million and a fighter would cost about US\$20 million, it is evident that Lithuania will not be able to afford such weapons in the foreseeable future.

23. R. Kuzniar, 'The geostrategic factors conditioning Poland's security', *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, vol. II, no. 1, Warsaw, Winter 1993, p. 20.

24. Letter from H.E. Algirdas Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania to Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary-General, 4 January 1994.

25. L. Barber, 'Actions agreed over frontiers', *Financial Times*, 11 December 1993.

26. J. Eyal, 'France's false sense of security', *The Independent*, 27 January 1994.

27. Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation, signed in Vilnius on 26 April 1994.

28. Declaration on Unity and Cooperation by the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania, signed on 12 May 1990; Treaty on Restoration of State Border between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania, signed in Birzai on 29 June 1993; Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental

Cooperation between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania, signed in Tallinn on 13 June 1994.

29. Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation and Treaty on the Lithuanian-Belarusian State Border between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Lithuania, both signed in Vilnius on 6 February 1995.

30. Treaty on the Foundations of Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic on Cooperation Regarding Economic and Social-Cultural development of the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR, both signed in Moscow on 29 July 1991.

31. R. Dalsjo, J. Tunberger, L. Wedin and H. Zettermark, 'Nordic Security Considerations and Arms Control', *FOA Pre-print*, (published by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment), Sundryberg, May 1993.

32. On 13 June 1994 at their meeting in Tallinn (Estonia) the heads of government of the Baltic states signed the statement on Baltic cooperation, thereby establishing the Baltic Council of Ministers and adopting the Terms of Reference for the Council.

33. P. Vares, 'Dimensions and Orientations in the Foreign and Security Policies of the Baltic States', in P. Jonniemi and P. Vares (eds.), *New Actors on the International Arena: the Foreign Policies of the Baltic Countries*, (published by the Tampere Peace Research Institute, Finland, 1993), p.29.

34. A very similar phenomenon of drifting apart is obvious in the lack of effective cooperation among the Visegrad countries.

35. *BNS News Agency*, Tallinn, 26 April 1994.

36. Joint Declaration of the President of the Republic of Lithuania and the President of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 17 February 1995.

37. Mare Haab is a research fellow at the Institute of International and Social Studies, Estonian Academy of Science.

38. Mart Laar, Lauri Vahre, Heiki Valk, *Kodu lugu II*, Tallinn, 1989, p. 46.

39. *Ibid.* p. 48.

40. *Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Voenno-morskogo flota SSSR*, Fond R-92, Delo 671, pp. 1-2; Fond R-92, Delo 672, p. 171.

41. General Laidoner was the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Defence Forces during the period of independence 1918-1940.

42. See T. Kelam, Deputy Speaker of the Estonian Parliament, in his speech made on 14 May 1993 in Tallinn on the occasion of Estonia becoming a full member of the Council of Europe.

43. This idea was put forward by Hannes Walter, former Secretary-General of the Estonian Defence Ministry. See *Hommikuleht* (Estonian daily), 3 May 1993.
44. Jaan Laas (ed.), *Eesti Kroonika 1992* (Annual of Current Estonian Affairs), Esintell Ltd., Tallinn, 1992, p. 57.
45. *Eesti Sõnumid* (Estonian daily), 8 April 1994.
46. *The Baltic Observer*, 17-23 March 1994.
47. Home Defence units are subordinate to the police. In an emergency, they become a part of the National Defence Forces and are subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.
48. Interview with Aleksander Einseln. See: *Rahva Hääl* (Estonian daily), 25 February 1995.
49. For example, in August 1993, one of the units of the Defence Forces, the Volunteer Light Infantry Company of Läänemaa, declared itself independent and refused to be subordinated to the general structures of the Defence Forces. Cases of the Defence League's lack of discipline, misuse of weapons and aggressive behaviour are not uncommon and are frequently reported in the Estonian media.
50. Data given by Indrek Kannik, the third former Minister of Defence since the September 1992 parliamentary elections. See *Hommikuleht*, 3 January 1994.
51. For more elaborate explanations on these security options see, P. Vares and M. Haab, 'The Baltic States: quo vadis?' in R.C. Karp (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: the challenge of transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1993), pp. 284-90.
52. The Popular Fronts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania stated, at their meeting in Tallinn in May 1989, that the Baltic nations 'aspire to sovereignty in a neutral, demilitarised Balto-Scandia', (i.e. the Baltic countries and Scandinavian states). See: The Election Platform of the Popular Front, *Vaba Maa* (special issue), Tallinn, October 1989.
53. Z. Butkus, 'Estija, Lietuva: kartu ar atskirai?', in *Komjaunimo tiesa*, 11 May 1989. See also: K Pusta, 'L'Union de Baltique', in *Les cahiers de l'Union européenne*, 1933, no. 5.
54. R. Zepkaite, 'Del Pabaltijo valstybiu sajungos (Baltijos Antantes) kurimo 1919-1925m', in *Lietuvos istorijos metraštis. 1984 metai*, Vilnius (1985), pp. 39-40.
55. For more on the history of the Baltic Union, see E. Mattisen, *Tartu Rahu* (The Tartu Peace Treaty), Tallinn, 1989.

56. E. Anderson, 'The Baltic States in the Council of the League of Nations', paper presented at the Fifth Conference of Baltic Studies, Columbia University, New York, 22 May 1976.

57. *Päevaleht* (Estonian daily), 15 March 1995.

58. Agreement of Baltic parliamentary and governmental cooperation between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania, Article 1, signed on 13 June 1994.

59. Since the beginning of the 1990s, statements have frequently been made by numerous politicians emphasising the need for Estonia to join NATO. The speaker of the Supreme Council of Estonia, Ulo Nugis, has declared repeatedly that, 'NATO and only NATO can provide us with sufficient security guarantees against Russia' (see M. Haab, 'Neutrality: an option for the foreign policy of a small nation-state? The case of Estonia' in *New Actors on the International Arena: the foreign policy of the Baltic countries*, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report no. 50, 1993, pp. 73-80). Similar ideas have been expressed by the Estonian Minister of State, Raivo Vare, suggesting that 'the best solution [for Estonia] would be direct military guarantees from the West.' Numerous additional examples indicate the overwhelming popularity of NATO among Estonia's politicians.

60. *Hommikuleht*, 13 January 1994.

61. *Pühapäevaleht*, (Estonian daily), 5 February 1994.

62. These ideas were voiced by the chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Vigleik Eide, in October 1991. He indicated that 'in an emergency situation, NATO can offer only political support to the Baltic states' (see *Baltic Observer*, 22-28 October 1992); and by the then NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, during his visit to the Baltics in March 1992 (see *Baltic Observer*, 20-26 March 1992).

63. The US National Security Revitalization Act, (House Bill 7), has been perceived by the Estonian politicians as a discouraging sign that the Baltic countries will be excluded from the list of NATO's possible new members. It is feared, especially against the background of the Russia-Chechnya conflict, that NATO's signs of disinterest in the Baltic region will lead to an increase in the role and interest taken by Russia in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Most of all, it is suspected that Russia's 'interest' would be an expansive one. These views were represented in the Estonian media by members of different political parties during the election campaign in February-March 1995, as well as by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

64. Speech by the Speaker of the Estonian Parliament published in the Estonian daily *Päevaleht*, 27 March 1995.

65. The working group was formed on 7 December 1993. In January 1994, seventeen sub-groups were formed to study the various economic and political aspects of any future integration.

66. *Hommikuleht*, 9 September 1994.

67. *Rahva Hääl*, 28 December 1993.

68. See 'Environmental Damage from the Soviet Occupation', a report by the Estonian Ministry of Environment, Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics, August, 1994, pp. 16-20.

69. A list of the retired Russian military in Estonia was handed over to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Russian Embassy in Tallinn on 27 August 1994. The list contained data on the 10,517 retired military up to 26 August 1994. Their dependents were not been included in these documents. The lists will be the responsibility of a special governmental commission, headed by Heiki Arike, Minister of the Interior.

According to a sociological survey carried out in May 1994 on problems connected with the retired Russian military in Estonia by the Institute of International and Social Studies and supported by the Olaf Palme International Centre (Sweden), the majority of the respondents considered themselves to be loyal to the Republic of Estonia and did not agree with the idea that the ex-military present a threat to the security of the Estonian Republic. 57.2% of respondents were also convinced that, as a result of the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia, the situation of retired military personnel would get worse.

70. The data was presented by Enn Tupp, the Estonian Defence Minister, on 10 October 1994 when speaking in the Estonian parliament. See *The Baltic Independent*, 14-20 October 1994.

71. For more data on Russia's military capacity see Pavel Baev, 'Russia's armed forces: spontaneous demobilisation', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, no. 13, 1994, pp. 8-13.

72. Foreign Minister Kozyrev emphasised that the protection of the rights of Russians in the former Soviet Union was one of the main strategic issues in Russia's foreign policy in 1994 (see, for example, Andrei Kozyrev, 'Foreign policy and the Russian parliament', *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 2 February 1994). President Yeltsin's New Year address to the state on Ostankino channel 1 TV on 31 December 1993 was even more outspoken: 'I would like to address especially those people of Russia who are outside Russia's border now. Dear compatriots! You are inseparable from us and we are inseparable from you. We were and will be together. On the basis of law and solidarity, we defend and will defend your and our common interests.'

73. This research was carried out by the Ethnopolitical Research Group of the Institute of International and Social Studies of the Estonian Academy of Sciences and the Department of Political Science of Duke University in September-October 1994.

74. Among the recent sociological studies on identity changes in Estonia, see, for example, 'changing identities in Estonia. Sociological facts and commentaries', *Institute of International and Social Studies, Estonian Academy of Sciences*, Estonian Sciences Foundation, Tallinn 1994.

75. Ilmars Viksne is a research fellow at The Defence Research Centre, Riga, Latvia.

76. The Baltic Landeswehr was composed of Baltic Germans; the Iron Division was formed from the remnants of the Eighth German Army. The remnants of the German Army did not leave Latvia after the successful counter-attack by Latvian-Estonian troops against the Landeswehr and the Iron Division in summer 1919, but only retreated to the west bank of the river Daugava. These forces were reinforced by White Russians and Germans, renamed and placed under the command of Bermont-Avalov.

77. Edgar Anderson, *History of Latvia 1920-1940. Foreign Affairs*, vol. 2, Stockholm, 1984.

78. Krzysztof Miszczak, 'Die Sicherheitsperspektiven Ostmitteleuropas. Zwischen NATO und Russland', *Europäische Sicherheit*, 6/1994.

79. 'Partnership for Peace; a framework document', *NATO Brief*, 2/1994, pp. 29-30.

80. 'European security and the role of Germany', 31st Conference on Security Policy in Munich. Federal Defence Ministry, Bonn 1994, p. 22.

81. *Diena* (Lithuanian daily), 28 February 1995.

82. *Diena*, 12 September 1994.

83. 'Latvijas integrācija Eiropā noris sekmīgi (Latvia is successfully integrating into Europe)', *Labrit* (Latvian daily), 16 November 1994.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Aleksandr Cipko, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 3 November 1993.

86. From an interview with Sergei Karaganov, member of the Russian Presidential Council, *Moscow News*, no. 7, 13-20 February 1994.

87. 'Vystuplenie A.V. Kozyreva na 48-j sessii generalnoj Assamblei OON 28 sentjabrja (address by A.V. Kozyrev to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1993)', *Diplomaticheskij vestnik*, no. 19-20, October 1993.

88. Aleksandr Zilin, 'Voennaya politika i vojna politikov (Military policy and the politicians' war)', *Moscow News*, no. 47, 21 November 1993.

89. *Labrit*, 9 April 1994.

90. 'Besorgnis in Lettland nach Drohungen Jelzins (concern in Latvia following threats by Yeltsin)', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 August 1994.

91. 'Lettland will Garantien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1994.